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THE SAMKHYA KARIKA

Studied in The Light of Its Chinese Version

II

BY

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Treatise on the "GOLDEN SEVENTY"
(Suvarṇasaptati)

Treatise on the SĀṀKHYA PHILOSOPHY
(Sāṁkhyaśāstra)

TRANSLATED BY

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PREFACE

The identity of the Sanskrit commentary on the Sāṁkhya, which Paramārtha translated into Chinese, has long been exercising the minds of Oriental scholars. M. Takakusu who translated the Chinese into French in 1904 was of the view that Gauḍapāda's bhāṣya was possibly the original, and worked out the parallelisms in some detail. When, however, the *Māṭharavṛtti* was discovered, it was found to present even greater resemblances and the view that Māṭhara's work was translated by Paramārtha was stoutly maintained by Dr. S. K. Belvalkar. A further study of the two, however, presented rather important differences of doctrine, which have been set forth by the present writer in an article on *Māṭhara and Paramārtha* (Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, July 1931). It was felt both by the present writer and a colleague of his—the Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sanskrit—that more positive results could be reached, if Paramārtha's version were made more accessible to Indian scholars, the majority of whom know neither French nor Chinese. To this end, it was decided to attempt a translation into English and a re-rendering into Sanskrit therefrom. To make the latter as faithful as possible, the rendering from the French has been made almost painfully literal. It is hoped that the reader will understand the need and tolerate the language. M. Takakusu's Introduction has not been translated, since it will not be of particular value for the need we have in mind. Further, that is mainly taken up with the parallelism to Gauḍapāda and the identification of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Vindhyāvāsin. The former is now of merely antiquarian interest, while the latter is still far from proven. In any case, it is likely to appeal to far fewer scholars than the text of Paramārtha's version.

It has not been thought necessary to translate all of M. Takakusu's footnotes. Those which are purely textual and are not intelligible to those ignorant of the Chinese language and script, have been left out; those textual notes which are intelligible have been translated, dots taking the place of words in Chinese script; the bulk of the notes, however, are both intelligible and easy to render; they have been translated, with here and there a note from the present translator, to give supplementary information, or to indicate some obvious error on the part of M. Takakusu. The present translator's notes are always enclosed in rectangular brackets.

In giving the Sanskrit Kārikās, M. Takakusu follows Gauḍapāda's reading; they do not always correspond to the translation; they have, therefore, been left out, except in some cases, where the French

translator has a note. Mr. T. R. Chintamani, when he has finished his work of re-rendering into Sanskrit, will no doubt have something to say on the correspondence of the Sanskrit Kārikās to Paramārtha's rendering.

The translator takes the opportunity of expressing his grateful thanks to the Editor of the *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extreme Orient*, and to M. Takakusu, for the kind permission to translate the work.

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LIMBDI GARDENS,
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THE SUVARṆASAPTATI

I. By reason of the torment (caused by)[1] *the three sorts of misery, the inquiry [research] into the means of destroying them (is necessary). Since the means are manifest, one will say, (this inquiry) is without object. No, since they are neither definite nor final [definitive].*[2]

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

I explain here the origin of this verse. There was formerly a wise ascetic called Kapila, born of heaven, innately endowed with the qualities : law (= virtue), knowledge, impassivity, existence by himself, these four qualities together constituting his self. Seeing humanity plunged in blind darkness, he experienced for it a great compassion. ' Alas ! they live and die in blind darkness.' Thinking thus, he looked round the world, and discovered Āsuri, brāhmin by birth, who had sacrificed to heaven regularly for a thousand years. Disguising himself, he approached the brāhmin, and addressed to him these words : ' O Āsuri, thou amusest thyself with leading the life of a master of a house [gṛhastha]'. Having spoken, he withdrew without receiving any reply. After another thousand years, he returned and repeated the same words. On hearing them, the brāhmin replied : ' O, honoured of the world, indeed I enjoy the life of the master of a house'. The ascetic heard him and went back from him in silence. Some time after, he returned, repeating the same words, and received the same reply. Kapila asked : ' Canst thou maintain thyself pure, and live the life of a brahmacārin ?' ' I can ', replied Āsuri. Thenceforward he renounced the way of his family and commenced the ascetic observances, as a disciple of Kapila.

[1] The words placed within brackets are supplied by me to show clearly what the translator has wished to say. The parts which coincide with the explanations of Gaudapāda have been indicated in the Introduction [not translated here ; See *BFEO*, IV, pp. 1-65, more particularly, pp. 5-24], to which it will suffice to refer.

[2] This verse is rendered into Chinese as literally as possible. Jijñāsā, ' research ', as in the Chinese. . . . . ' desire to know ', is employed as a noun, even as one sees from the commentary. ' Means ' is in Chinese ' causes,' employed in the same sense. One may, at first sight, find my translation a little forced, but we cannot translate otherwise, if we read with care the commentary, the Chinese original of which is omitted here, for want of space.

One may ask[1] : 'With what end is the brāhmin's investigation made?' The reply is: *by reason of the torment (caused by) the three sorts of miseries.* What are these three? That which comes from *within*, that which comes from *without*, that which is caused by *the heavens*. (The internal misery is of two kinds, *physical* and *mental*).

The internal first: In consequence of disorders caused by the wind, the heat or the phlegm one may have a malady. In the book of medicine it is said: 'the part of the body below the navel is called the seat of wind, that below the heart is called the seat of heat, and all that is above the heart belongs to phlegm. It happens sometimes that the wind element increases and presses [against] the heat and the phlegm; then is produced a misery caused by the wind. The misery caused by the heat or by the phlegm is produced in the same manner'. One calls these miseries *physical* miseries. The mental miseries are separation from what one loves, contact with what one hates, and non-success in one's enterprises. In realising these three, one experiences a misery in the mind. All the foregoing miseries are internal.

External miseries: miseries produced by men, birds, beasts, venomous serpents, landslips, the breach of a dam, etc., are called *external.*

Third kind of miseries: those caused by *the heavens.* All the sufferings and failures occasioned by celestial phenomena such as cold, heat, wind, rain, thunder and lightning are called miseries caused by the heavens.

Because (we) are tormented by these three sorts of miseries we commence the investigation which ought to serve as a means to destroy these miseries.

One may say: 'The means capable of destroying the three miseries are sufficiently known. First, that which is treated in the eighth section of medical science[2] is capable of destroying the miseries of the body. Secondly, the six objects of sense,[3] wherein one finds pleasure, are capable of curing the miseries of the soul. When these means (of cure) are already so known, why an extra investigation?' The reply is: 'Your opinion is not admissible. Since (the ordinary means) imply two defects, a (philosophical)

[1] '*One may ask*' is in Chinese '*a profane person says*', the questioner being called 'a profane person' throughout the work.

[2] The eight divisions of medicine are given by Yi-tsing, whose enumeration accords with the eight sections of the Āyurveda. See my *I-tsing's Record*, p. 222.

[3] The six objects of sense are: form, sound, odour, taste, touch and all these objects combined. The last category is otherwise called *dharma*, 'law', by the Buddhists, being the object of the *manas*. These are the six *guṇas* of the *Garbha-Upaniṣad.*

investigation is not against (that is to say, without) reason. What are these two defects? It is that the means are not definite, certain and that they are not final'.

One may say: 'If the eight sections of medical science, etc., imply the two defects and consequently are insufficient as means of destroying the miseries, we have other means taught in the four Vedas, and as these means are fruitful, being certain and final, your investigation is superfluous. It is said in the Vedas: "Of old we have drunk the soma; that is why we have become immortal, and have obtained entry to the resplendent heaven, where I see and know all the divinities. What can misery or enmity avail against me? How can death touch me?"'[1] To that one replies:

II. Similar to the obvious (means) are the revealed (means) which are accompanied by impurity, loss, superiority or inferiority. Another means, different from these two is excellent, because of the knowledge of the evolved (principle), the non-evolved (principle) and the Spirit (of the Self).

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

The obvious means are those of which medical science treats. They imply two defects, that is to say, they are neither definite nor final. What we call the revealed means, they are those which one obtains by tradition. They have been taught at the beginning by Brahmā and transmitted to the wise ascetic (the ṛṣi Kapila). One calls them then the revealed means, understanding thereby the four Vedas. The Vedas themselves imply then the two defects, like the medical science [which is an] obvious [means]. Besides that they have three other defects:

(1) They are *impure*. It is said in the Veda: 'O thou animal! thy father, thy mother and thy kindred all approve of thee. Now thou art about to abandon thy present body to be re-born in the

[1] *Ṛgveda*, VIII, 4, 8, 3:
apāma somam amṛtā abhūmāganma jyotir avidāma devān!
kiṃ nūnam asmān kṛṇavad arātiḥ kimu dhūrtir amṛta martyasya ||
Gauḍapāda gives this verse under v. II. (One does not find in the Chinese text any verse corresponding to the two maṅgala verses of Gauḍapāda: 'Kapilāya namaḥ' etc.—The verse recalling the seven sages of the School, given by Gauḍapāda, is not found in the Chinese; but cf. the commentary on vv. XLIII and LXXI, *infra*.—The verse 'pañcaviṃśatitattvajño' etc., of Gauḍapāda is given under vv. II and XXXVII, *infra*. In comparing the text of Gauḍapāda with the Chinese, it is necessary to combine vv. I and II. Gauḍapāda seems to have re-modelled the materials he had before him, in changing the order of the original commentary, which is represented by the Chinese).

heavens'.[1] 'According to the prescriptions of the horse-sacrifice, six hundred animals less three (equal to 597) are killed '.[2] If the number is incomplete, the sacrificer cannot obtain birth in heaven, nor the enjoyment of the five sorts of acts, that is to say, the act of amusing one-self, etc.[3] For the case where some one utters a falsehood, some devas or ṛṣis declare in the Vedas that that does not imply a crime. Such faults (killing, lying, etc.) are found in the Vedas: consequently the Vedas themselves are not pure.

(2) They imply *decay* or *loss*. It is said in the Vedas: 'Without reason, Śakra, Indra and the God Asura are extinguished, because of their age, for one does not escape time'.[4] The conditions of [that] life exhausted, the sacrificer will be removed from the heavens. Thus (the remedies according to the Vedas) imply decay and loss.

(3) They are subject to *superiority* and to *inferiority*. Just as, in seeing the rich, the poor and the needy envy them, just as the ugly one is jealous of the beautiful, and the ignorant person of the wise one, even so it is in the heavens: those of the inferior grade look on those of the superior grade with a sentiment of envy. Even thus there is superiority in one and inferiority in the other.

The three defects with the two mentioned higer up, render the Vedas inefficacious as a means (to the destruction of misery). One will say: 'If it is thus, what means is excellent?' The reply is, '*Opposed to these two means, the Vedic means and the ordinary means. there is an excellent means.*' Neglecting the two others, one ought to search for an efficacious remedy. The means that one proposes here (that is to say, philosophical investigation) has five excellent points. It is (1) definite, (2) final, (3) pure, (4) permanent, (5) universal: For these reasons it is superior to the two above-mentioned.

[1] Cf. *Ṛgveda*, I, 163, 13. This passage is often cited in Buddhist works in Chinese. In the commentary to the *Śataśāstra*, it is said: 'At the commencement of creation, he who is born with a good spirit and with good elements will have a place in the eternal heaven. But he who is endowed with less good spirit and elements is born in the world, where he will seek to be re-born in heaven. To that end, he will offer a horse-sacrifice (*aśvamedha*). A white horse is let loose in the fields for a hundred days, sometimes for three years Wherever the horse may go, the sacrificer will follow it and will distribute gold to all. Then the horse is caught and killed. At the moment of killing it, one pronounces this formula: "O Paśu (animal)! We kill thee". A sacrificed horse can thus be re-born in heaven'. Paramārtha, the translator, adds that the law of the horse-sacrifice is found in the four Vedas, that in the *Pāramitaśāstra* the sixty-four good qualities (of the horse) are enumerated, and that one of them is the sacrifice of the horse to heaven [?].

[2] Gauḍapāda reproduces the same passage:

ṣaṭ śatāni niyujyante paśūnām madhyame 'hani |
aśvamedhasya vacanād ūnāni paśubhis tribhiḥ ||

I do not find this verse in the Veda.

[3] That is to say, the acts of the five *karma-indriyāṇi*.

[4] The verse of Gauḍapāda is a little different:

bahūnīndrasahasrāṇi devānām ca yuge yuge |
kālena samatītāni kālo hi duratikramaḥ ||

One may ask: 'How can one obtain this means?' Here is the reply: '*By the knowledge of the evolved, the non-evolved, and the Spirit (of the Self).*' The evolved comprises: (1) the 'Great' (*Mahat*, that is to say, the Intellect); (2) The Sentiment of self (*ahaṁkāra*); (3) the five subtle elements (*tanmātrāṇi*); (4) the five organs of sense (*jñāna-indriyāṇi*); (5) the five organs of action (*karma-indriyāṇi*); (6) the mind (*manas*); (7) the five gross elements (*mahābhūtāni*). These seven have been created by Nature (*prakṛti*). Nature has not been produced, because she is the original (productive) cause. The Spirit (*ātman*) is the knower (the subject). 'He who knows the twenty-five (principles), wherever he may be found, by whatever path he may go, whether he have tresses of hair, or whether he have only a tuft, or whether he have a shaven head, that one is released, without any doubt.'[1]

One may ask: 'How can we distinguish Nature, the produced principles and the knowing subject?' In reply to that it is said:

III. Primal Nature is not a product.[2] *Mahat etc. are either producers or products. The sixteen are products alone; the knowing subject (the Spirit) is neither a producer nor a product.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

Primal Nature produces all that exists without herself being produced by another object. That is why one calls her 'Nature, the producer (*mūla-prakṛti*).' In other words, Nature produces Mahat and the others; that is why one has given her the name of 'root (*mūla*).' Not being produced by another object, she is not a product.

Mahat, the Sentiment of self (*ahaṁkāra*), and the five subtle elements (*pañca tanmātrāṇi*), these seven are either producers or products. (For) Mahat is produced by Nature, it is then a product; it produces the Sentiment of self, it is then a producer. The Sentiment of self comes from Mahat, it is then a product; as it produces the five subtle elements, it is also a producer. The five subtle elements come from the Sentiment of self, they are then products but they produce the five gross elements (*mahābhūtāni*) and the organs of sense (*indriyāṇi*), they are then productive; that is to say,

[1] . . . . This verse recurs under v. XXXVII, where, however, the last hemistich differs a little . . . . 'equally to obtain Deliverance'. Alberuni (I, 133) attributes a similar verse to Vyāsa.

[2] What I translate as 'product' is in Chinese . . . . 'mutation' (*vikṛti*). The commentary explains it throughout by 'product'.

the subtle element of sound produces ethereal space and the organ of hearing, the subtle element of odour produces the earth and the organ of smell, and so on. These seven then are either productive or produced.

'*The sixteen are products alone.*' The five gross elements, ether, air, etc.; the five organs of sense, ears, eyes, etc.; the five organs of action, speech, hands, etc.; and the mind, these are the 'sixteen' which are neither produced by others nor are productive; it is then said that they are products alone.

'*The knowing subject (the Spirit) is neither a producer nor a product.*' By the knowing subject one understands the self endowed with a knowing activity. The Spirit is neither a producer nor a product. Different from the three preceding (Nature, the seven and the sixteen), it is neither a producer nor a product.

One may ask: 'By what sort of inference can you establish the three categories? For, in the world, one can know (all) by inference, even as with a balance or a measure we know the weight or the length.' Here is the reply:

IV. By perception, by comparison and by sacred authority, we are capable of knowing all the objects (of the discussion). There are then three sorts of proofs. It is by the proof that an object (of the discussion) is established with success.

SANSKRIT KĀKIKĀ.

Commentary.

In this doctrine [system], the proof is of three sorts:

(1) Proof by *perception*. The knowledge (of that which ought to be proved) is obtained by the organs of sense and the objects of sense. It cannot be demonstrated (by inference); (however), it is uncertain and of a double [deceitful ?] character. Such is the proof by perception.

(2) Proof by *comparison*. This proof presupposes the proof by perception, and it is of three sorts: (*a*) inference from what precedes (*pūrvavat*, i.e. with the cause), (*b*) inference from what follows (*śeṣavat*, i.e., with the effect), (*c*) inference by analogy (*sāmānyataḥ*).

(3) Proof by *sacred authority*. If an object cannot be known by the proofs of perception or comparison, we refer ourselves to a sacred authority, and the proof will be made. Thus, the regions like Heaven or Uttarakuru can be known neither by perception nor by inference. We can know them only by referring ourselves to a sacred authority. As for sacred authority, it is said: 'Āgama (tradition) is sacred authority; a saintly person is free from all error,

and, being free from all error, he never utters a lie, by reason of the absence of cause.' [1]

'*We are capable of knowing all the objects* (*of the discussion*).' Even if there were a different method of proof or a different object (of the discussion), they would not be excluded from these three. The six methods of demonstration, that is to say, comparison (upamāna) and the others,[2] are included in sacred authority.

'*It is by proof that an object* (*of the discussion*) *is established with success*'. The objects (of the discussion) are the twenty-five categories, which comprehend all that exist. '*Established with success*' means that the twenty-five (*tattvas*) are clearly known. How can they be called the objects (of the discussion)? Because *it is on their account that there is knowledge or proof. Therefrom results the stablishment of an object* (*of the discussion*). By evidence [of the senses], by comparison [inference], and by authority we can establish the three categories (*vyakta, avyakta, jña*), in brief, and the twenty-five in full.

Some one will ask: 'You say that proof is three-fold; What are the characteristics of the three-fold proof?' Here is what is said in reply:

V. Proof by perception is the knowledge which we obtain in the face of an object of sense. Proof by comparison (*inference*) *is known to be of three sorts; it supposes a characteristic mark* (*predicate*) *and that which bears that mark* (*subject*). *The teaching of a saintly person is called sacred authority.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Proof by perception*, etc.' The ear obtains knowledge by sound . . . . and the nose by odour. It is only a perception (which the organ obtains), but not a judgment by comparison (inference). That is what is called *proof by perception.*

'*Proof by comparison is known to be of three sorts.*' (1) Starting from what precedes (antecedent, *a priori*, *pūrvavat*, 'with the cause'). (2) Starting with what remains (subsequent, *a posteriori*, *śeṣavat*, 'with the effect'). (3) By analogy (generic, *sāmānyataḥ*). The triple knowledge is obtained by perception, and it is capable of

[1] Gauḍapāda gives that verse thus:
āgamo hy āptavacanam āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ |
kṣīṇadoṣo 'nṛtam vākyam na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt ||

[2] Here is a reference probably to Jaimini's six kinds of proof, but the details, which Gauḍapāda gives are not found in the Chinese. The six *pramāṇas* of Jaimini are:
(1) arthāpatti, 'presumption'; (4) pratibhā, 'comprehension';
(2) sambhava, 'proportion'; (5) aitihya, 'communication';
(3) abhāva, 'privation'; (6) upamāna, 'comparison'.

distinguishing the three cases (cause, effect, and similarity), and the three times (past, present and future). That is what is called the *three-fold inference*. For example, men see black clouds and infer that it is about to rain (*pūrvavat*); or else, seeing the water of a river recently muddled, they know that rain has fallen higher up the river (*śeṣavat*); or else, they see the mangoes flower at Pāṭaliputra and infer from it that in Kośala too, they are in flower (*sāmānyataḥ*).[1]

'*It implies a characteristic mark* (*predicate*) *and that which bears that mark* (*subject*).' The mark and that which bears the mark are found united and are not separated one from the other. When one perceives the mark, the proof can be established by inference.[2]

'*The teaching of a saintly person*', etc. For example, the four Vedas given out by the god Brahmā, and the Dharmaśāstra of the king Manu.

Some one may ask: 'You say that there is a three-fold proof by inference. What is the domain of each method of proof?' The reply is:—

VI. It is in reasoning by comparison, analogy, etc., that an object beyond the domain of the senses can be demonstrated.[3] *If it is difficult to attain by reasoning, it becomes manifest, when one follows sacred authority.*[4]

[1] The *pūrvavat* inference is an inference of the effect through the cause, *a priori*: It is the means of knowing the future through the present. The *śeṣavat* inference is the inference of the cause through the effect: it is the means of knowing the past through the present. The *sāmānyataḥ* inference is the inference by analogy, based simply on generic properties: it is the means of knowing the present through the present. The examples given in the Chinese text seem to be better adapted to the purpose than those of Gauḍapāda, who has employed other examples in the second case and in the third. The second example of the Chinese agrees with that of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*:

Pūrvam kāraṇam, tadvat talliṅgakam, yathā meghonnati-viśeṣeṇa vṛṣṭyanumānam| śeṣaḥ kāryam, talliṅgakaṁ śeṣavat, yathā nadivṛddhyā vṛṣṭyanumānam| sāmānyato dṛṣṭam, kāryakāraṇabhinnaliṅgakam, yathā pṛthivitvena dravyatvānumānam||

'Antecedent, that is to say, cause; characterised by that or having that (cause); e.g., from the accumulation of clouds to infer rain. Subsequent, that is to say, effect; characterised by that; e.g., from the rising of the river to infer rain. Analogous (or generic); characterised as distinct at the same time from cause and effect; e.g., from the fact that something is earthy, to infer that it is a substance'. See Wilson, note to v. V of the *Sāṁkhya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya*.

[2] Fujii, the Japanese commentator, using a well-known comparison, says in this place: 'The sign, it is the smoke (the object of preception), and the possessor of the sign, it is the fire (the subject of the inference). Seeing the smoke we infer: there is a fire in the forest'. *Cf.* Garbe, *Mondschein*, p. 447, note 4.

[It is difficult to see why M. Takakusu interprets *mark* as *predicate*, which would mean *probandum*, not *probans*, as obviously intended by the verse and its commentators.]

[3] Word for word: 'can be established'.

[4] Paramārtha has construed the text in the same manner as Gauḍapāda has interpreted it; he differs from Colebrooke and from Lassen whose translations are based on the authority of the *Sāṁkhyacandrikā*, as Wilson has shown. Wilson himself has understood in the same way as the Chinese translator.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*In reasoning by comparison*', etc. Among the (three) methods of inference, reasoning by analogy is here mentioned. Objects like Nature and the Spirit are beyond the senses, and it is by analogy alone that one knows them. The effects, that is to say, Mahat (the Intellect) and the others, have each three qualities: joy, anxiety, blindness.[1] They are the qualities of products. The qualities of the products do not exist without those of the root (Nature). From the products we can infer the root. Thus Nature is known through reasoning by analogy from her products. The Spirit ought to exist, because her [Nature's] products, that is to say, Mahat (the Intellect), and the others exist only because (the knowing subject) exists. Thus, Spirit also is established by analogy.[2] If there is any point whatever which one cannot know either by perception or by inference, one can comprehend it by referring to sacred authority, since it is beyond the domain of our intelligence; for example, Sakra, the Lord of the Heavens, Uttarakuru (in the North), etc.

One may ask: 'Nature and the Spirit do not exist, because one does not see them, in the same way as the second head or the third arm of some one who is not the self-existent God'. Replying to that we say that we have eight sorts of objects invisible, but existent, for in real existence there are several phases. What are these eight? We shall show them in this verse:

VII. Because they are too far or too near; because the organs are imperfect or because the mind is troubled; because of their smallness [*subtlety*] *or because an obstacle is interposed; because the objects press them or prevail over them; or because other similar objects accumulate* (*the objects, though existent, are invisible*).

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

Among the objects really existing in the world, there are those which are invisible because of their *distance;* thus an object fallen on the other bank is not seen by the men on this bank.[3] Others are invisible because of their *proximity;* thus, a particle of dust in the eye cannot be perceived. Others are imperceptible because of the *defectiveness of the organs*; thus, the blind or the deaf cannot see or hear. Others are obscured by the *trouble of the mind*, for one is incapable

[1] That is to say, *sukha, duḥkha, moha*. These terms are employed here in the same sense as *sattva, rajas, tamas*. See further on, v. XII.

[2] See further on, v. XVII, commentary.

[3] Gauḍapāda employs here, as usual, a simpler example.

of thinking of a given subject, when the mind is elsewhere. Invisibility because of *smallness;* thus, the smoke, the heat, the dust and the vapour dispersed in the atmosphere cannot be seen. Invisibility because of an *obstacle;* thus, an object behind a wall cannot be known. Invisibility because of the *predominance (of another object);* thus, when the Sun rises, the light of the Moon and the stars cannot be seen. Invisibility because of *resemblance;* thus, a bean cannot be distinguished in a mass of beans, because all the beans are of the same kind. Among existing objects, these eight cannot be seen.

Besides these, there are still four objects which (now) do not exist and for that reason cannot be seen:

(1) Invisibility of an object before its production; thus, seeing a lump of clay, one cannot see the utensil which will be made out of it;

(2) Invisibility, because the object has been destroyed; thus, when a pitcher has been broken, one knows no more of its form;

(3) Invisibility because of mutual exclusion; thus, in a horse, one cannot recognise a cow, and *vice versa;*

(4) Invisibility because of absolute absence; for example, the the second head or the third arm of some one who is not Īśvara.[1]

These twelve sorts of existences or of non-existences are invisible. If you say that Nature and Spirit do not exist, because invisible, your opinion is not, then, admissible.

Some one will ask: 'If, as you say, Nature and Spirit are invisible, to which of the twelve categories do they belong?' Here is the reply: 'For a certain cause they are invisible'. What is that cause? We explain that in this verse.

VIII. It is because of her subtlety that Nature cannot be seen, and not because she does not exist. Mahat (the Intellect) and the others are her effects, of which some are not similar to Nature, while others are similar to her.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*It is because of her subtlety that Nature cannot be seen, and not because she does not exist*'. Nature exists really, but, being too subtle, she cannot be seen, even as smoke or other similar things dispersed in the atmosphere cannot be seen, because they are too fine. Nature, then, is not non-existent, [and] invisible in consequence, like the second head or the third arm.... Some one may ask:

[1] The explanation of the four non-existent objects is superfluous in this place. Gauḍapāda has been well-advised to omit it completely. [But see *Māṭhara-vṛtti*, v. VII.]

'If she is invisible, how can you know that she exists?' Here is the reply: 'The cause can be seen by its effects. Nature is the cause; what she produces, they are her effects. The existence of Nature can be inferred by analogy from her effects. What are her effects? Mahat (the Intellect) and the others are her effects. Nature produces Mahat, Mahat produces the Sentiment of self, the Sentiment of self produces the five subtle elements, the five subtle elements produce the remaining sixteen, that is to say, the eleven organs of sense and action, and the five gross elements. The effects, that is to say, Mahat and the others, are endowed with the three qualities (*guṇa*) and we know that these same qualities are equally inherent in Nature'[1].

'*Some are not similar to Nature, while others are similar to her*'. The effects can be divided into two sorts: similar or dissimilar to Nature; thus, a man begets two children, one of whom resembles the father, while the other does not resemble him at all. Among the products of one and the same cause, there are some which resemble the original principle, and others, which resemble it in nothing. This will be explained further on.[2] That is the opinion of this school and of others on the subject of effects.

Some one may ask: 'If the disciples ought to follow (a doctrine as) their principle, whence comes it that some affirm that the effects exist already in the cause, while the others affirm the contrary, and others finally assert that the effects are neither existent nor non-existent in the cause? For, the opinions of the wise differ thus. There are some wise ones who affirm that a pot and other earthen utensils exist already in the lump of clay, which serves to make them.[3] The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that at first they do not exist, and that later they exist (that is to say, the effect is not in the cause). According to the disciples of Śākyamuni, a pot is neither existent nor non-existent in the lump of clay.[4] We have then three opinions,

[1] We should always remind ourselves that all that exists is endowed with the three guṇas. To speak of the existence of the guṇas of an object amounts to saying that the object itself exists.

[2] See v. X, commentary.

[3] This is the opinion which consists in saying that the effect exists in the cause (Sāṁkhya doctrine).

[4] There is a reference to these passages in the commentary on the *Śataśāstra* (translated in 608; It is not included in the editions of the Chinese Tripiṭaka). Here it is: 'In the "Golden Seventy" (Sāṁkhyakārikā), the opinions of the two schools are refuted, and the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school is established. The two schools are: (1) The doctrine of Ṛṣabha (Le-cha-p'o . . .), who maintains that the effect is neither existent nor non-existent in the cause; (2) The doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, who assert that the effect does not exist in the cause'. This citation informs us that the Chinese text, to which the commentator on the *Śataśāstra* refers, contained here 'Ṛṣabha' in the place of 'Śākyamuni.' But Ṛṣabha is the name given to the Saint of the Jainas; the Chinese have explained it by Ni-k'ien-tse . . .=Nirgranthika. An Indian

and we prefer the middle one to the others'. Replying to that, we shall refute first the opinion of Śākyamuni, later that of the Vaiśeṣikas. The opinion of Śākyamuni, 'neither existent nor non-existent', is inadmissible, because it is self-contradictory. To say non-existent, that would be to say nothing. To say 'not non-existent', that is to say 'existent.' Existence and non-existence together make a contradiction; it is as if you should say 'that man is neither dead nor living.' As that opinion is self-contradictory, it cannot be maintained. Thus it is with the doctrine of Śākyamuni.[1]

(Note of Paramārtha:—This refutation, (that is to say, the last phrase) is false. Why? Because Śākyamuni had not such an opinion. When Śākyamuni affirms non-existence, he does not wish to say [it is] nothing. He does not wish to declare existence either, when he says that it is not non-existent, for, he does not insist on either of the two extremes. The refutation, then, does not affect Buddhism, in any way.)

Now, we go on to refute the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas. In our opinion, there are five reasons, which demonstrate the existence of the effect in the cause. What are these five reasons?

IX. From nothing nothing can be made. It is necessary to take (the material, which will serve as) cause. All the objects are not the product (of any cause whatsoever). The capable agent alone can accomplish a given action. As is the cause, so is the effect. For all these reasons, we maintain that the effect exists already in the cause.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

(1) '*From nothing nothing can be made*'. In the world, where there exists nothing, any attempt to produce has no result. Thus, oil cannot be produced from sand. But if the materials exist, an object can be produced. Thus, by pressing sesamum, one gets oil. The product cannot be obtained, if it does not exist in the object. Now, we observe that Mahat (Intellect) and the other principles are the products of Nature; we know then that the principles are contained in Nature herself.

(2) '*It is necessary to take (the materials, which will serve as) cause.*' If a man has the need to make an object, he necessarily takes

version of our text ought to have this variant. It would, perhaps, be better to read here throughout Ṛṣabha in the place of Śākyamuni. See, lower down, the note of Paramārtha.

[1] The refutation is directed against Buddhism and Jainism. Paramārtha, in his note, explains it in such a manner as to place Buddhism out of the question.

the cause of that object; thus, a man who thinks that to-morrow a brāhmin will come to dine in his house procures milk to make curds. Why does he not take water? Because, to make an object, one ought to take the cause of that object. We see then that Mahat pre-exists in Nature.

(3) '*All the objects are not the product* (*of any cause whatsoever*)'. If the effects did not exist in the cause, it would not matter which is the product of which cause. Grass, gravel or stones could then produce gold or silver. But such phenomena do not exist. We see then that the effects are contained in the cause.

(4) '*The capable agent alone can accomplish a given action*'. For example, a potter with his instruments makes pitchers and plates from a lump of clay, but he is not capable of making these utensils, using plants or trees. We know then that Nature implies her derivatives.

(5) '*As the cause, so the effect*'. The effect is of the same class as the cause. Thus, shoots of barley come from seeds of barley. If the effect did not exist in the cause, the fruit could not be of the same class as the seed. In this case, the seeds of barley would be able to produce shoots of beans or some other thing. As we do not know such phenomena, we see that the effects are existent in the cause. The Vaiśeṣikas assert that the effects do not exist in the cause; but their opinion is inadmissible. We know that the effects exist necessarily in the cause.

Continuing to reply to the question, I resume the explanation of the preceding verse; as for the dissimilarity of the effects with Nature, there are nine points to observe:[1]

X. The evolved principles have a cause, are impermanent, multiple, limited, endowed with action, dissoluble, possessing parts, residing in another and dependent on another; (in these points) evolved principles differ from Nature (the non-evolved principle).

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

(1) '*Have a cause*'. All (the principles), Mahat and the others, up to the five gross elements, have a cause. Nature is the cause of Mahat, which itself is the cause of the Sentiment of self; the Sentiment of self is itself the cause of the subtle elements; the sixteen

[1] The commentary agrees with that of Gauḍapāda, almost word for word. These arguments may be traditional in the Sāṁkhya school, but an agreement so close is not, however, an act of chance. These lines, even as some others, are found in the commentary on the Chinese text.—For the exposition of the ninth verse, I refer to Wilson's note in his *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, where one will find a good comparison of Sāṁkhya doctrines with European systems.

categories, that is to say, the five organs of sense and the others,[1] have for cause the five subtle elements. In the case of Nature, it is not thus, for, she is not the product of a cause. That is why one says she is not similar (to the other principles).

(2) '*Impermanent*'. Mahat and the others are produced by Nature. Being products, they are not permanent. There are two sorts of impermanence: (*a*) that which lasts a certain time; (*b*) that which changes at every moment. So long as a cause of change does not intervene, a thing remains what it is. Thus, a forest or other similar things remain what they are, so long as fire does not destroy them; but when the calamity of fire befalls them, the five gross elements and the others resolve themselves into the five subtle elements and the others, the five subtle elements in the Sentiment of self, the Sentiment of self in the Mahat, and Mahat itself in Nature. That is why one says that Mahat and the others are impermanent and that Nature is not so; for, she is permanent, and does not resolve herself into another thing.

(3) '*Multiple*'. This means that Mahat and the others are or diverse sorts, for, men are not similar, each to the rest. It is thus with the Sentiment of self and the others. But Nature is one, for, she is common to all men.

(4) '*Limited*'. Nature and Spirit (the Self) extend everywhere on the earth, in the [middle] space, and in heaven; but for the other categories, Mahat and the others, it is quite different, for, they never extend everywhere. In this, they differ from Nature.

(5) '*Endowed with action.*'—Mahat and the others, when they are on the point of originating or going out, are capable, by means of the thirteen instruments,[1] to make the subtle body migrate in birth or death, to extend itself or to contract itself, to go or to come; they are, in consequence, endowed with action. It is not thus with Nature, for, of her there is neither expansion nor contraction.

(6) '*Dissoluble*'. Mahat and all the other categories are dissoluble, because they are no longer visible, when all the evolved principles are returned to their origin (that is to say, to Nature). For example, when the five gross elements are resolved into the five subtle elements, we do not see them any more; even so, when Mahat is resolved into Nature, we see it no more. But it is not thus with with Nature, for, there is no dissolution of her.

(7) '*Possessing parts*'. Mahat and the others all have parts, and all the parts are different, each from the rest. It is not thus with Nature, for, she is permanent and indivisible.

[1] That is to say, the five gross elements, the five organs of action, and the *manas*.

(8) '*Residing in another*'. This means that Mahat resides in Nature, the Sentiment of self in Mahat, the five subtle elements in the Sentiment of self, and the sixteen—that is to say, the five gross elements and the others—in the five subtle elements. It is not thus with Nature, for, she is not produced by another thing.

(9) '*Dependent on another*'. Mahat and the others have been produced since the beginning, and products do not exist by themselves; just as, as long as a father lives, his children have no independent existence. In this sense, one says that they are dependent. It is not thus with Nature, for, the source cannot depend on another thing.

For these nine reasons, the source and the product are dissimilar; that is why one says that they do not resemble each other.

Their dissimilarity is thus explained, and I go now to speak of their similarity. These similarities are all set forth in this verse:

XI. The source is similar to the product, for, both are endowed with the three guṇas, *inseparable, objective, common to all, unconscious, prolific. Spirit is neither similar nor dissimilar.*

Sanskrit Kārikā

Commentary.

The similarities are of six sorts:

(1) '*Endowed with the three guṇas*'. By evolved principles we understand Mahat, the Sentiment of self, etc., up to the five gross elements. These twenty-three possess the three guṇas, that is to say, joy, misery, ignorance:[1] As the products are endowed with the three guṇas, we infer that their source too is endowed with them; for, the products are not different from their source, even as a black cloth is made of black thread; the effect thus produced resembles in its colour the original material. Since the evolved principles have the three guṇas, and the evolved is derived from the source, we know then that Nature also is endowed with the (three) guṇas. That is why it is said that the source and the products are similar.

(2) '*Inseparable*'. The evolved principles cannot be separated from their three guṇas. We distinguish the body of a cow from that of a horse; the two cannot be considered as one. For the evolved in their relations with their three guṇas, the case is quite different from that (example). Just like the evolved, Nature too has three guṇas. As they are equally inseparable, (it is said that) the source and the products resemble each other.

[1] The translator has used here terms which are too strong [wide] to translate *triguṇas*, but lower down he translates correctly; see v. XII.

(3) '*Objective*'. The evolved, Mahat and the others, are employed by Spirit; that is why one says that they are objective. It is the same with Nature; she is employed by Spirit.

(4) '*Common to all*'. The evolved, Mahat and the others, are common to all individual selves, even as a servant who has many masters, each one of whom employs her and makes her work. It is the same with Nature; all individual selves use her at the same time. That is why it is said that they are similar.

(5) '*Unconscious*'. The evolved, Mahat and the others, are incapable of knowing and judging of an object, if it is agreeable, painful or indifferent. As Spirit alone is endowed with reason, all the things separated [distinct] from Spirit do not have reason. Nature too then is deprived of it. The source and the products are thus equally unconscious and resemble each other in this point.

(6) '*Prolific*'. Mahat is capable of producing the Sentiment of self, that the five subtle elements, and so on up to the five gross elements. Nature too is capable of producing Mahat; the source and the products then resemble each other.

(7) '*Spirit is neither similar nor dissimilar*'. The evolved principles and Nature are similar in these six points, while for Spirit there is not such similarity. There is then the opposite of similarity. The evolved principles and Nature are dissimilar in the nine points (enumerated in v. X), while in the case of Spirit, there is dissimilarity (with the evolved principles) in eight points of the nine; it is in that that it is said to be dissimilar. Spirit differs from Nature in this point alone, that it is multiple. [1]

Some one may say: 'It has been explained that the evolved principles and Nature are endowed with the three guṇas. What now

[1] In this relation, Spirit (*ātman*) behaves like an evolved principle (*vyaktam*); in that [relationship], it is the opposite of eight among the nine characteristics of the non-evolved principle (*avyaktam*), that is to say, of Nature. [The latter half of this sentence makes no sense; what M. Takakusu wants to say seems to be fairly clear from the succeeding sentences, but his mode of saying it in the last sentence is certainly not happy. The French of it is given for the benefit of those who may like to make an attempt at it for themselves.—'en cela elle est l'opposé de huit parmi les neuf caracteristiques du principe non evolué (*avyaktam*), c'est-à-dire de la Nature'.] While Nature is one, Spirit is multiple. This point is well-established in the Chinese text, even as in the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, 149 (Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, p. 67): janmādivyavasthātaḥ puruṣabahutvam; in the *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, v. XI (Calcutta ed., p. 60; Garbe, *Mondschein*, p. 568): puruṣasya evam anekatvam vyaktasādharmyam; and in the *Sāṁkhyacandrikā*, v. XI: evam vyaktasarūpy apy anekasaṁkhyāyeti. The text of Gauḍapāda: 'anekam vyaktam ekam avyaktam tathā pumān apy ekaḥ' differs then essentially from the Chinese and the Indian texts we have just cited. Wilson has attempted to place these opinions in harmony, but his explanation is rather forced. [Cf. Māṭhara: tad yathā vyaktād visadṛśam pradhānam tathā pradhāna-sadharmā puruṣaḥ. tathā hi: ahetumān nityo vyāpī niṣkriya *eko* nāśrito 'liṅgo niravayavaḥ svatantra iti.]

are the characteristics of the three guṇas?' We reply in this verse:

XII. Pleasure, misery [pain] and ignorance are the nature of the three guṇas; to shine, to produce and to bind are their functions; for each to dominate the rest, for each to depend on the rest, for each to originate the rest, to form pairs and to intervene (one for the other), these are their properties.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Pleasure, etc., are their nature*'. The guṇas are (1) *sattva*, (2) *rajas*, (3) *tamas*. Pleasure is the nature of *sattva*, misery is that of *rajas*, and obscurity or stupidity is that of *tamas*. This is how their three characteristics manifest themselves.

'*To shine, etc., are their functions*'. What are the actions of the three guṇas? The first (sattva) is capable of shining or illuminating, the seccond (rajas) of producing, and the third (tamas) of binding. These are the functions appropriate to the three guṇas.

What, now, are the properties of the three guṇas? They are five in number:

(1) '*For each to dominate the rest*'. If joy (sattva) predominates, it is capable of subjugating misery or indifference, even as the brilliance of the Sun is capable of hiding the Moon and the stars. If misery (rajas) is preponderant, it subjugates joy and indifference, even as the rays of the Sun hide the Moon and the stars. If indifference predominates, it subdues misery and joy, even as in the brilliant light of the Sun, the Moon and the stars do not show themselves.

(2) '*For each to depend on the rest*'. The three guṇas dependent each on the other, are capable of performing all things, even as three sticks leaning each on the other can support a basin for ablution.

(3) '*For each to originate the rest*'. Sometimes joy produces misery and indifference, sometimes misery produces joy and indifference, sometimes indifference originates misery and joy. Just as three men dependent on one another perform an act, even so the three guṇas residing in the Mahat and the others, and dependent on one another, produce birth and death.

(4) '*To form pairs*'. Joy forms sometimes a pair with misery or else with indifference. Misery too sometimes forms a pair with joy or indifference, which in its turn, forms pairs with joy or misery, as is explained in the verse of the ṛṣi P'o-so:[1] 'joy is coupled with

[1] . . . . P'o-so is probably Vyāsa. Paramārtha often employs. . [the symbol for P'o] to transcribe *vyā: cf.* lower down, v. XXIX, note 4, where *p'o-na* transcribes *vyāna*.—Gauḍapāda cites this verse, but without giving its source.

misery, misery with joy, sometimes joy or misery is coupled with indifference'.

(5) '*Intervene one for the other*'. Each one of the three guṇas produces the acts of the other: (*a*) Suppose a lady of a royal line, whose countenance and form are extremely beautiful. This can be called the guṇa of joy. This guṇa, it is the beauty, which gives pleasure to her husband, and to his family. Up to this, the guṇa of beauty exercises, then, its appropriate action. But that lady can stir up envy or suffering in other ladies of equal position. In this case, the joy produces, then, the effect of another guṇa (that is to say, of rajas). But it produces also the effect of yet another (guṇa), that is to say, of indifference (tamas); thus, her servants, always weary of serving her, and not having the means of delivering themselves, are of sombre and depressed humour; that is why one says that this guṇa produces the effect of another guṇa (that is to say, of tamas). All this would say that the guṇa of joy is capable of producing its own offects and those of the others. (*b*) The guṇa of misery (rajas) produces its own effects and those of the others. Suppose a bandit has captured that lady of royal lineage, and that a prince, mounted on a horse and holding a whip in his hand, comes to deliver her. Here, misery becomes the presence of the prince. Though the prince be the object of fear, his presence in this case makes the lady rejoice at the thought of being delivered by him. This would say that (the guṇa of misery) produces the effect of another (that is to say, of sattva). But as the prince will kill the bandit, (his presence) causes misery to that one. One says, then, that misery produces its own effect. The other bandits are made motionless like the trunks of trees, at the sight of the prince. One says, then, that misery (rajas) works the effect of another, that is to say, of stupor (tamas). All this makes [one] see that misery produces its own effect and those of the others. (*c*) Stupor too produces its own effect and those of the others. Suppose a black cloud, thick and vast, which produces lightning, etc. The guṇa of stupor (tamas) is, then, cloud. The peasants who sow and plant will rejoice at it. One can, then, say that it produces the effect of another guṇa (that is to say, of sattva). But it also produces its own effect: suppose a loving lady separated from her husband; at the sight of the cloud and the lightning, she will be depressed, thinking that her husband will be incapable of returning to the house. Producing stupor (tamas) to the lady, one can then say that stupor produces its own effect. But it also produces misery. Suppose some merchants on the way, suffering from humidity and

The verse is given in entirety by Vācaspatimiśra in his *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, where it is called an āgama (atrāgamaḥ).

cold, not able to support them ; they will have vexation from it. This is the production of the effect of another guṇa (that is to say, of rajas).

These five are the properties pertaining to the three guṇas. They have, besides, their special marks :

XIII. Sattva *has for characteristic, lightening and illumining*, rajas, *holding and moving*, tamas, *weighting and enveloping. The union of the contraries is similar to a lamp.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Sattva ..... illumining*'. What is light and luminous is *sattva*. When *sattva* predominates, all the organs (of action and of sense) are light, brilliant and refined, capable of seizing all the objects. It is proper to know that it is in this case that sattva predominates.

'*Rajas, holding and moving*'. 'To hold' means to have the mind excited without taking others into account ; thus, an elephant in fury, desiring to fight, engages in fight at the sight of an enemy elephant. When *rajas* predominates, man seeks the fight, for, his mind is constantly agitated, and he cannot keep himself tranquil. It is proper to know that it is in this case that rajas predominates.

'*Tamas, weighting and enveloping*'. When the guṇa of tamas increases, the whole body becomes heavy ; all the organs (of action and of sense) being enveloped, one is incapable of perceiving an object. It is proper to know that it is in this case that tamas predominates.

One may ask : 'If the three guṇas are opposed to one another like enemies, how can they do anything together?' In reply we say : 'The three guṇas are, indeed, opposed to one another, as you say, but, pertaining to one individual self, and not being independent, they are capable of doing something together. It is thus that the three different materials are united to make a lamp. The fire is different from the oil and the wick, and the oil is different from the wick and the fire ; nevertheless, these materials, opposed to one another, produce (by uniting themselves) an effect for men. It is even thus with the three guṇas. Though opposed to one another, in their nature, they act (together) for Spirit'.

One will ask : 'You have mentioned higher up (commentary, v. XI) six sorts of resemblance (between Nature and her products), and I have understood the first ; but I do not know the five others. You have explained with success the three guṇas (that is to say, the first point of resemblance) ; you ought to treat of the five other (points of resemblance) also.' The reply is given in these lines :

XIV. Inseparability and the other (properties) can be established by the (three) guṇas, and by the non-existence of the contrary. The non-evolved principle can be demonstrated by the attributes of the effects, which agree with those of their causes.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Inseparability .... be established*'. The meaning of the five (properties), inseparability, etc., has already (v. XI) been explained. (Their existence) in the evolved principles has already been established. It can be equally established in the case of Nature, in consequence of the effects (of which Nature is the cause).

'*By the (three) guṇas and by the non-existence of the contrary*'. We have proved that the five properties, inseparability, etc., exist in the evolved principles, and we infer that they exist certainly in Nature too (the non-evolved principle). How? By the three guṇas. As the three guṇas do not exist independently (of the evolved principles), we know that they are not separable therefrom. If they are inseparable therefrom, we know that the guṇas and the evolved principles ought to be considered as objects (that is to say, that they are not the knowing subject). If we call them objects, we infer that they are common to all.[1] If all enjoy it equally, we know that they are unconscious.[2] They are objective, universal and unconscious; it follows from this that they are prolific. Knowing that the six characteristics exist in the evolved principle, we know that they exist in Nature too. 'How do you know that?' If the contrary were the case,[3] then they would not exist at all; in other words, if we suppress the six properties of the cause, *i.e.*, of Nature, the six properties of the effects could not exist any more. Even thus, if we take away the threads, there is no longer the cloth; where there is the cloth, there are the threads,[4] the threads and the

[1] That is to say, that all individual souls ought to enjoy them.

[2] That which enjoys (i.e., Spirit) alone, being conscious.

[3] . . . It is difficult to see what 'the contrary' relates to. It is certainly not Spirit, as Colebrooke and Vācaspatimiśra understand it (Garbe, *Mondschein*, v. 14). The Chinese text speaks here of *prakṛti* and seems to mean this: 'It is a fact that five properties exist in the *vyaktam*. They ought equally to exist in *prakṛti* (*avyaktam*). In effect, if there were room for the contrary, that is to say, if they did not exist in *prakṛti*, these properties would not exist in any fashion, even in the *vyaktam*. For, the effect (*vyaktam*) ought to accord with its cause (*avyaktam*)'. Gauḍapāda too seems to give a different explanation: see Wilson's note.

[4] . . . = Gauḍapāda: yatraiva tantavas tatraiva paṭaḥ. [Cf. Māṭhara: iha hi yatra tantavas tatraiva paṭaḥ, yatra paṭas tatraiva tantavaḥ, etc.].

cloth being inseparable. The effects proceed necessarily from a cause; the cause and the effect are inseparable.

'*The attributes of the effects, which agree with those of their causes*'. In the world, the attributes of all the effects are in accord with those of their causes, even as a cloth made of red thread produces an effect of red colour. It is the same with the evolved principles. By the three guṇas, the existence of the five other characteristics can be proved. By the six characteristics of the effect, we infer the existence of the same six characteristics in the non-evolved principle (Nature). One may ask: 'If there is in the world an object impossible to show, that object is considered as non-existent, like the second head (of a man). No more can Nature be demonstrated. How do you know that she exists?' We reply: 'The weight of the Himālaya is unknown; nevertheless, one cannot say that it has no weight. It is the same with Nature'. 'For what other reasons do you know her existence?'

XV. Because the specific classes are finite; because there is homogeneity; because there is production effectuated by energy; because there is a difference between cause and effect; because there is no distinction in the form of the universe.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

How do you know the real existence of Nature?

(1) '*Because the specific classes are finite*'. In the world, a produced thing has a measure, a dimension, a number; thus with a given quantity of clay, the potter makes vases of a limited number. Suppress the original matter (clay), and there will no more be either numerical measure or vase. Seeing that the vases have a numerical measure, we know that they have an original matter. The comparison of the threads constituting a cloth is equally applicable. Among the (twenty-five) principles, the evolved principles, Mahat and the others, possess equally a numerical measure. What is that numerical measure? Mahat is one, the Sentiment of self is one, the subtle elements are five, the organs are eleven, and the gross elements five. As for the evolved principles, we see that they have a numerical measure. In reasoning by analogy, we know that there is a Nature (source) [1]. If there were not a Nature, the evolved principles would not have numerical measure, and the principles themselves would not exist.

[1] See v. VI.

(2) '*Because there is homogeneity*'. When we break a piece of sandal, the fragments of sandal may be numerous, but the nature of sandal will remain one; it is the same with the evolved principles. Mahat and the others differ from one another, but the nature of their three guṇas is one. From this, that the nature (of the three guṇas) is the same, we infer that all (the evolved principles) have a (common) source, and thus we know the existence of Nature (*prakṛti*).

(3) '*Because there is production effectuated by energy*'. Where there is energy, there is production; thus, a potter capable of producing earthen utensils can produce earthen utensils alone, but not clothes, etc. The production of objects is made only by power. This power has necessarily a source, that is to say, the potter himself. It is the same with the evolved principles. Their production is effectuated by energy. As they are produced by energy, we know the existence of Nature.

(4) '*Because there is difference between cause and effect*'. The difference between cause and effect can be observed in the world; for example, a piece of clay is the cause; a pitcher, etc., is the effect. These utensils can keep water, oil, etc., while clay cannot do that. The difference between cause and effect can be further illustrated by the example of the threads and the cloth. Then, Mahat and the other evolved principles are really effects. Seeing these effects, we know that there is an independent cause, of a different character. We know by that that Nature exists.

(5) '*Because there is no difference in the form of the universe*'. There is yet a special reason for which we affirm that Nature really exists. By form of the universe, it is necessary to understand the three worlds: earth, (intermediate) space, heaven. In the period of reality (that is to say, general dissolution, *pralayakāla*), the worlds have no longer any distinction. The five gross elements and the eleven organs (of sense and action) resolve themselves into the five subtle elements, and have no longer any difference; further, Mahat is re-united to Nature and ceases to be differentiated. We can no longer say which is the evolved and which the non-evolved. One may think: 'As at the time of reality [dissolution] there are not evolved principles, there is not Nature either; if there is not Nature, there is neither birth nor death'. That idea is incorrect. The reality of Nature will reproduce the three worlds (after the general dissolution). We know then the existence of Nature.

For these five reasons we affirm that Nature exists.

'Though Nature exists,' one will say, 'she would not be able to produce the evolved, because she has no concomitant (cause); thus, a man alone cannot give birth to an infant, and a single thread makes

not a cloth. And it is thus with Nature'. In reply, we utter these lines:

XVI. Nature is the cause of the production of the evolved principles. For, the three guṇas produce the effects by their union and by their transformation; (this is so) as of water, because the guṇas differ one from another.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Nature is the cause . . .*' This means that, possessing the three guṇas, Nature is capable of producing the evolved principles. If Nature were not endowed with the (three) guṇas, your words (that Nature alone cannot produce any effect) could be exact. But if Nature possesses the three guṇas, it is not correct to say that (not having a concomitant, Nature) cannot produce an effect.

'*The three guṇas produce the effects . . . .*' Just as many threads produce together a cloth, even so the three guṇas, associating with one another, are capable of producing an effect. One may ask: 'In the world, production is of two sorts. In the first place, there is production by transformation: milk produces cream etc. In the second place, there is production without transformation. Thus, parents give birth to a child. To what class of production belongs that of the evolved principles by Nature?' We reply: 'There is transformation, even as milk produces cream. It is in transforming herself that Nature produces the evolved principles; the evolved is not then a thing other than Nature. This being the case, the production of specific classes (birth) cannot be comprised under that (sort of production)'. One may ask: 'But one cause can by no means produce different sorts of effects. If then Nature is one, how can she produce the three worlds? Those who are born in heaven are joyous and happy, those who are born among men are plunged in pain and misery, and those who are born among animals are sombre and dark. If they all proceed from a single cause, how does it happen that there are these three degrees?' Here is the reply:

'*(This is so) as of water, because the three guṇas differ one from another*'. 'The water which comes from the atmosphere is, at the beginning, of a single taste. It transforms itself when it arrives on the earth. It becomes of a varied taste, according to the different receptacles.'[1] If it is a vase of gold, its taste is very sweet; if it is in the earth, its taste differs, according to the quality of the earth. It is the same with the three worlds. Though produced by a single

[1] The words within quotation-marks form a verse in the Chinese.

(cause), that is to say, by Nature, (the effects differ), as the three guṇas differ one from another. In heaven, *sattva* predominates, and for that the gods are constantly happy ; among men *rajas* abounds, that is why the majority of men suffer misery ; *tamas* exercises its power among the animals, that is why animals are always sombre. In all the worlds, the three guṇas operate always mutually, but as there is a predominance (of one over another) we have the differences which we have just seen. Thus, while still being one, Nature can produce the three worlds, but it is the inequality of the three guṇas which produces good or evil.

We have already examined Nature in entirety, and we come to pass to (its opposite), Spirit. How do we know that there is a Spirit, if it is subtle like Nature ? The existence of Spirit is demonstrated in the following lines :

XVII. Because all assemblage (of objects) is for another (object) ; because the contrary of the three guṇas ought to exist ; because it is necessary to have some one who resides ; because it is necessary to have some one who enjoys ; because one seeks absolute isolation (of Spirit) ; for these five reasons we affirm the existence of Spirit.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

If one comprehends what Nature and the products are, one obtains Deliverance (*mokṣa*), because one is then that which knows. This has been explained in the first verse. Later, enumerating the five causes, we have demonstrated Nature and the evolved principles (v. XIV). Spirit, which is very subtle, is to be demonstrated now. Spirit really exists.

1. '*Because all assemblage (of objects) is for another*'. We see that in the world all assemblages are for another object. Thus, beds, chairs, etc., assembled together, are necessarily for the use of others, and not for these objects themselves. There are others (objects or persons), who come to make use of these objects, and it is solely for that reason that they have been assembled. Reason, etc. exist then for others. It is the same with Mahat, etc. The assemblage of the five gross elements is called a (human) body. The body does not exist for itself ; we know with certainty that it exists for another. The other in this case is properly Spirit. We know then that Spirit really exists.

2. '*Because the contrary ought to exist*'. One has explained in a verse higher up (v. XI) that there are six points of similarity between the non-evolved principle and the evolved principles :

'They are endowed with the three guṇas, inseparable, objective, common to all, unconscious, and prolific'. The cause and the effects are similar in these points, but Spirit is opposed to similarity and to dissimilarity at the same time. Because it is opposed on the six points, we affirm the existence of Spirit.

3. '*Because it is necessary to have some one who resides*'. From the Spirit inhabiting the body, the latter becomes endowed with functions. If Spirit does not reside, then the body is not an agent. As is said in the *Treatise of the Sixty Categories* : 'Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides, and it is because of that that she can produce actions.' [1] By that we know that Spirit exists.

4. '*Because it is necessary to have some one who enjoys*'. In this world, when we see food and drink made fragrant in six ways, we infer that it is necessary to have some one who will eat and drink that ; even so when we see Mahat and the others, we know with certainty that, as in the case of food, some one will enjoy it. We know then that Spirit exists.

5. '*Because one seeks absolute isolation . . .*' If there were only our body, we should not have the need of the final Deliverance taught by the sages. In antiquity, a ṛṣi went to some brāhmins and spoke thus : 'All of you are rich in [the] Vedas ; all of you drink soma ; all of you see the face of a child ; could you later become bhikṣus ?'. [2] Of what good would such an idea be, if we had only the body ? We know then that by the side of the body it is naturally necessary to have a Spirit. If there were no distinct Spirit by the side of the body, religious practices like cremation or the throwing into the water of the remains of dead parents or masters would not have any merit, but might drag in demerit. For that reason we know that Spirit exists. Here are yet other words (in verse) of the

[1] It is to be remarked that Gauḍapāda, just like the Chinese (text), cites here the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. The phrase : 'Nature, it is that in which Spirit resides,' supposes the Sanskrit *purusādhiṣṭhitam pradhānam pravartlate* (see Gauḍapāda) [also Māṭhara]. *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is in Chinese....., 'Treatise of the Sixty Categories'. Paramārtha understands then by that the title of a special work, which confirms the opinion of Deussen and Garbe (see Garbe, *Mondschein*, p. 627, note 3). The sixty categories are also cited in v. LXXII (Gauḍapāda), but the Chinese text has here 'the fifty categories' (.....), which are enumerated under v. XLVII, and mentioned in v. XLVI (pañcāsatbhedaḥ). The sixty categories are the fifty we have just mentioned and ten others, to wit : (1) Spirit, (2) Nature, (3) Intellect, (4) Sentiment of self, (5—7) the three guṇas, (8) the tanmātras, (9) the five elements, (10) the eleven indriyas. For another enumeration, see Wilson's note on v. LXXII. For a fuller discussion, see Garbe, *Sāṅkhyaphilosophie*, p. 58.

[2] These lines are difficult. The Chinese has . . . . Some Japanese authors explain . . . . [rendered here as *all*] by 'always' ; I attribute, however, to these characters the ordinary sense : 'all'. 'All of you see the face of an infant' is understood by some to mean 'all of you have a youthful visage' (because you drink soma) ; some others explain it thus : 'all of you have accomplished the duty of a gṛhastha, in obtaining a child.'

sages : ' The nerves and bones are the cords and the posts, the blood and the flesh are the earth and the plaster ; (the body is the house of) impurity, impermanence and suffering. We have to rid ourselves of this aggregate. Reject that which is just and that which is unjust ; reject that which is real and that which is unreal ; and the very idea of rejecting, [1] reject that ! That which is pure will alone remain '. If Spirit did not exist, nothing would remain (after such an elimination). By the words of the sages, we know with certainty that Spirit exists.

By the five reasons we have just given, the truth of the existence of Spirit is established. One may ask : ' What is the characteristic mark of Spirit ? Is there a single Spirit for all the bodies, or has each body its Spirit ? If you wish to know why I put you that question, I reply that it is because the opinions of the several masters contradict one another on this point. Some say that a single Spirit fills the bodies of all the beings ; thus, in a chaplet of strung pearls, the thread is one, while the pearls are numerous ; thus, the sixteen thousand wives of Viṣṇu enjoy at the same moment. It is the same with the unique Spirit, which fills the bodies of all the beings. Other masters affirm that each body has a Spirit for itself. Thence the doubt which arises in me.' We reply : ' There are several Spirits. Where there is a body, there there is a Spirit.' How do we know that ? We explain that in the following verse :

XVIII. Because birth, death and the organs differ (with the individuals) ; because occupations are not the same (for all) ; because the three guṇas act differently, the principle of the individual Spirit is established.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *Because birth, death . . . .*' In case Spirit were one, when one man is born, all the others would be born also. The women of different countries would become pregnant at the same time ; they would be brought to bed at the same time ; they would have all boys or all girls. But as all (the individual spirits) are different, the births do not take place at the same time. We know that there is a plurality of spirits. If Spirit were one, at the death of one man all the other men would die also. As this is not the case, we know that Spirit is not one.

' *Because the organs differ*'. If Spirit were one, when one man becomes deaf, all the men would become deaf together. Blindness, aphasia, and all the maladies would be simultaneous in all. As this is not the case, we know that there is a plurality of spirits.

[1] . . . . ' the idea of some one who rejects.'

'*Because the three guṇas. . . .*' If there were a single Spirit, the three guṇas would not be different. But imagine a brāhmin who has given birth to three children, of whom the first is intelligent and happy, the second excitable and suffering, the third dull and stupid. If Spirit were one, one (of the children) being gay, the others ought to be that also; even so, in the case of stupidity. You have illustrated the unity of Spirit by the example of strung pearls and (the wives) of Viṣṇu. But your opinion is not correct. For the five reasons which we have just seen, we know that there is a plurality of spirits.

One may ask: 'There remains in me a doubt: should Spirit be considered as an agent or as a non-agent? If you wish to know why I have this doubt, I shall tell you: in the usual language one says: "Spirit goes, comes, acts."[1] According to the Sāṁkhya system, Spirit is not an agent, while it is an agent, according to the Vaiśeṣikas. In this way a doubt arises in me'. We reply: 'Spirit is not an agent'. How can we know that? We explain that in these lines:

XIX. Because (it is) at the same time the opposite of Nature and the products the fact that Spirit is a witness is established; it is isolated, neutral, a spectator, and passive.

Sanskrit Kārikā:

Commentary.

'*Because it is the opposite. . . .*' As is explained in two preceding verses (X & XI), Spirit differs from Nature and the evolved principles. Being the opposite of the characteristics of the two, it has no resemblance to them. Now, the three guṇas are the agents, and Spirit is their opposite; it is then a non-agent. One may ask: 'To what [end] will it serve you, this statement that Spirit is not an agent?'

To establish the fact that it is a witness.—'*Spirit is a witness*', because it is knowing, but that is not the case with the other principles (the twenty-four tattvas). It is '*isolated*'; being the opposite of Nature and the products, it is isolated (from the three guṇas), because it is pure. It is '*neutral*'; the three guṇas are variable, since they are endowed with expansion and contraction. Spirit is different from them; that is why one says it is neutral. Just

[1] Gauḍapāda: loke puruṣaḥ kartā gamtetyādi prayujyate. [*Cf.* Māṭhara: loke tāvat puruṣo gacchati dhāvati tiṣṭhati śocati, puruṣeṇe 'dam kṛtam iti vipratipattiḥ].

as an ascetic mendicant resides at the same place and does not follow the persons who come and go, but contents himself with looking at them go about, even so Spirit simply looks at events, while the three guṇas expand and contract themselves (that is to say, submit to changes) in birth and death. That is why one says it is neutral. Being the opposite of Nature and the products (which are unconscious), Spirit is conscious, and that is why one calls it '*spectator*'. Finally, one says further that Spirit is '*passive*'. That the three guṇas may be agents, that has been shown; and that Spirit exists really, that it may be diverse and passive, that has been equally established.

Some one will ask: 'If Spirit is not an agent, to what pertains then the act of determination? Suppose that at this moment I have to practise religious duties, to renounce evil or to realise a vow, by whom will the act of will be made? If it were by the three guṇas, the three guṇas would be conscious, since it is (an act of intelligence). But it has been said previously that the three guṇas are unconscious (v. XI). If it is Spirit that determines the act, Spirit is an agent; but it has been said that Spirit is not an agent (v. XIX). There is then a dilemma'. The reply is in this verse:

XX. As the three guṇas are conjoined with Spirit, the unconscious appears to be conscious. As the three guṇas are the agents, the neutral seems to be an agent.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*As the three guṇas . . .*'. The three guṇas are unconscious, but agents, while Spirit is conscious, but inactive. When the two are conjoined, the guṇas appear to be conscious. Just as a vase of gold, placed in contact with fire, becomes hot, and placed in contact with water, becomes cold, thus, the three guṇas conjoined to the knower (Spirit) are conscious and effect the act of will. That is why one says that the unconscious appears to be conscious. You say that, according to the common speech of the world, Spirit ought to be an agent. To that we reply here:

'*As the three guṇas are the agents, the neutral appears to be an agent*'. Because of its union with the guṇas, Spirit is called an agent, though not being that. A brāhmin, [who has] got in by error into the company of brigands, is taken with the brigands, punished with them and called a brigand, for he was with them; it is the same with Spirit; because it is conjoined to agents, one says, in the com-

mon language of the world, that it is an agent. One may ask : ' How can Nature unite herself to Spirit ? ' We reply in this verse :

XXI. Spirit seeking to see (Nature with) the three guṇas, and Nature wishing to procure (for Spirit) absolute isolation, unite together, like the paralytic and the blind. By this means, the world is created.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *Spirit seeking to see . . .* '. Spirit has this desire : ' I wish to see Nature with the three guṇas ' ; and thus it unites itself with Nature.

' *Nature wishing to procure (for Spirit) . . .* '. Spirit, in the presence of a difficulty, is not capable of seeing and knowing ; with the intention ' of procuring it absolute isolation ' Nature unites herself to Spirit ; just as the king of a nation unites himself to his people with the intention ' of employing them to his ends,' and the people unite themselves with the king, with the intention ' that he should make them live ' [1]. Thus is effected the union of the king and his people. It is for one and the same end that the union of Spirit and Nature is effected, Spirit seeking to see Nature, and Nature desiring the absolute isolation of Spirit.

' *Like the paralytic and the blind.*' Here is an example. There was once upon a time a caravan, which proceeded to Ujjayini ; it was attacked by a band of brigands. Having had the worst [of the fight], all the merchants fled and dispersed, abandoning one [who was] blind from birth, and one [who was] paralytic from birth. The blind one ran here and there, in vain, while the infirm one was seated and looked on. The infirm one asked him : ' Who are you ? ' The other replied : ' I am blind from birth. Not knowing the road, I run without aim. But who are you ? ' The infirm one replied : ' I am paralytic from birth. I am capable of seeing the road, but I cannot march. I propose that you take me on your shoulders and that you carry me, while I show you the road.' Associating themselves in that fashion, the two men could get to their homes ; by means of such a union, they could attain their goal. Returned to their homes, they separated[2]. Even thus, when Spirit has perceived Nature, it attains final Deliverance. When Nature has worked the complete isolation of Spirit, the two separate.

[1] [Cf. Māṭhara : yathā rājā puruṣeṇa samyujyate preṣaṇam me kariṣyatī 'ti ; puruṣo 'pi rājñā samyujyate vṛttim me dāsyatī 'ti.]

[2] This fable has had a wide success. One finds it among others in the Babylonian Talmud (*Sanhedrim*, fol. 91[b]), and in the *Gesta Romanorum* (Cowell, *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, 229, note 2).

'*By this means, the world is created.*' Just as a male and a female united together give birth to offspring, even so Spirit and Nature are capable of creating Mahat and the others, by their union. One may ask: 'You have explained that their union produces the world; in what order is that done?' We reply in this verse:

XXII. From Nature arises Mahat, from that the Sentiment of Self, from that successively the sixteen (principles); in the sixteen (principles) are the five (subtle elements); from these proceed the five gross elements.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*From Nature arises . . .*'. Nature is also called the supreme cause (*pradhāna*), or else *Brahman* or else 'that which comprehends all' (*bahu-dhānaka*).

'*Proceed successively . . .*'. Nature existing by herself is not produced by another thing. Nature first produces Mahat. Mahat is also called Intellect (buddhi) or Intelligence (mati) or Universal Notoriety (khyāti)[1] or Knowledge (jñāna) or Wisdom (prajñā). Where there is Mahat, there is knowledge; that is why one calls it 'Knowledge.' Then, from Mahat proceeds the Sentiment of self; it is called the Source of the five elements (bhūtādi), or the Modified (vaikṛta), or the Radiant (taijasa). From the Sentiment of self proceed the sixteen principles, that is to say, the five subtle elements (pañca tanmātrāṇi), the five organs of sense (pañca buddhīndriyāṇi), the five organs of action (pañca karmendriyāṇi), and Manas. The five subtle elements are: (1) sound (śabda); (2) touch (sparśa); (3) form (rūpa); (4) taste (rasa); (5) odour (gandha). The five categories are but the archetypes or the energies of sound and the others. The five organs of sense are: (1) the ear (śrotra); (2) the skin (tvak); (3) the eye (cakṣus); (4) the tongue (jihvā); (5) the nose (ghrāṇa). The five organs of action are: (1) the tongue (vāk); (2) the hand (pāṇi); (3) the foot (pāda); (4) the organ of generation (upastha); (5) the anus (pāyu). The sixteen principles proceed from the Sentiment of self. Thus it is said that Mahat, the Sentiment of self and the sixteen principles (proceed from Nature).

'*In the sixteen principles are the five (subtle elements).*' The five subtle elements are among the sixteen principles; they produce the five gross elements, to wit: (1) the subtle element of sound

[1] '. . . penetrating everywhere, universal.' I am not quite sure that Paramārtha really translates *khyāti* by this word. It may be that he had read *vyāpini* or *vyāpti* in the place of *khyāti*.

produces the gross element of ether (ākāśa); (2) that of touch produces air (vāyu); (3) that of form produces fire (tejas); (4) that of taste produces water (āpaḥ); (5) that of smell produces the earth (pṛthivī). I have already explained that in seeing the three principles, i.e., Nature, the products, and Spirit, one realises final Deliverance.[1] One may ask: 'You have explained that from Nature proceeds Mahat. But what is the characteristic of Mahat?' We reply in these lines:

XXIII. The determinative Intellect, that is Mahat. Virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power are its characteristics, when it is affected by sattva. *Their opposites (are its characteristics), when it is affected by* tamas.

Sanskrit Kārikā

Commentary.

'*The determinative Intellect...*' What is the determinative Intellect? The knowledge that such a thing is an obstacle or that such an object is a man, that is what one calls determinative Intellect, the Mahat. In Mahat, there are eight categories, of which four are endowed with *sattva*, and four with *tamas*. Those endowed with *sattva* are: virtue, knowledge, absence of passion, and power. What are the forms of virtue? They are *yama* (restraint) and *niyama* (obligation). Yama has five sub-divisions: (1) not to put oneself in anger; (2) to respect one's spiritual masters; (3) to possess internal and external purity; (4) to be moderate in eating and drinking; (5) not to become addicted to license. Niyama too is divided into five: (1) not to kill; (2) not to steal; (3) to speak the truth; (4) to practise continence (brahmacaryā); (5) not to flatter. The accomplishment of all these ten things, that is virtue.[2] What is *knowledge?* There are of it two sorts, internal and external. *External knowledge* comprehends the six divisions of the Veda, i.e., the Vedāṅgas: (1) the śikṣā treatise (phonetics); (2) Vyākaraṇa (grammar); (3) kalpa (ritual); (4) jyotiṣa (astronomy); (5) chandas (prosody); (6) nirukta

[1] Cf. Gauḍapāda: vyaktā-'vyakta-jñavijñānān mokṣa iti.

[2] In the enumeration of niyamas, Gauḍapāda follows Patañjali: ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmacaryā, aparigraha; the yamas are: śauca, samtoṣa, tapas, svādhyāya, īśvara-praṇidhā (adoration of God). The last of the niyamas and all the yamas, save one, differ from the Chinese enumeration, which, however, has greater chances of being the original than that of Gauḍapāda. Above all, the adoration of God is very improbable for the atheistic system of the Sāṁkhya. It may be that Gauḍapāda has adopted the ordinary enumeration of the Yoga school. He expressly cites his source: Pātañjale 'bhihitaḥ. [M. Takakusu has been the victim of a strange confusion, possibly due to a defective copy of Gauḍapāda: ahimsā, satya, etc. constitute yamas, not niyamas, while śauca etc. are niyamas, both according to Patañjali and Gauḍapāda, who but follows the former. Cp. also Māṭhara.]

(etymology). The knowledge of these six subjects is called external knowledge.[1] *Internal knowledge* is that which is produced between the three guṇas and the Spirit. By external knowledge one apprehends the world. By internal knowledge one obtains final Deliverance.—What is absence of passion? There are of it two sorts, one internal and the other external. The *external :* for all that we possess we find difficulties and pain on three occasions: (*a*) when we seek it ; (*b*) when we guard it ; (*c*) when we lose it. Further, (the fact of possessing) implies two defects: attachment and the (obligation to) injure others. It is in that idea that one becomes a wandering mendicant, renouncing worldly desires. But that form of aversion does not yet produce Deliverance. This degree of absence of passion can be obtained by external knowledge. As for internal absence of passion, we know already that Spirit is different from the three guṇas, and it is for that reason that one makes oneself a monk. We obtain first internal knowledge, and, later, the absence of passion, which leads us to Deliverance. External absence of passion leaves us still in *saṃsāra*. It is the internal absence of passion that gives us Deliverance. Power is of eight sorts: (1) to become very minute, to be reduced almost to nothing (aṇimā); (2) to become excessively light, like Manas (laghimā) ; (3) to expand oneself throughout the atmosphere (mahimā) ; (4) to obtain easily what one desires (prāpti); (5) to be the supreme Lord of the three worlds, superior to all (iśitva) ; (6) to enjoy immediately all that one desires (prākāmyam); (7) not to depend on another, to be capable of making the beings of the three worlds to come, and to make oneself served by them (vaśitvam); (8) to live where one wills, that is to say, to be capable of living as one wills, it does not matter at what moment or at what place (yatrakāmāvasāyitvam).[2]

The four categories (virtue, knowledge, absence of passion, and power) are the characteristics of *sattva*. When *sattva* predominates, it is capable of hiding *rajas* and *tamas ;* then, Spirit is joyous, and enjoys the faculties (virtue, etc.), which are the marks of *sattva*.

[1] Gauḍapāda adds : purāṇa, nyāya, mīmāṃsā, dharmaśāstra.

[2] Though saying that there are eight categories, Gauḍapāda enumerates nine of them. Wilson does not seem to have perceived it. I think that *garimā* has been added by error or as a synonym of *mahimā*, because this word is not explained lower down. The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* reads : *yac ca* kāmāvasāyitvam in the place of *yatra*.

[It should be noted that at least one edition of Gauḍapāda (Benares, Chowkhamba Press) omits garimā and enumerates only eight. Māṭhara, on the contrary, includes garimā and seems to mention nine. It is possible, however, that on his enumeration too there are only eight, for, yatrakāmāvasāyitvam may mean (as Vācaspati understands it) satya-saṁkalpatā, and be thus practically synonymous with vaśitvam (though Vācaspati himself takes the two as distinct, and omits garimā from his list). The list of lordly powers varies thus with different commentators, in some details.]

Their opposites are the characteristics of *tamas*. These are: (1) vice; (2) ignorance; (3) passion; (4) infirmity. These four categories are the marks of *tamas*. When one adds to the four categories affected by *sattva* the four affected by *tamas*, one has eight divisions in Mahat. When they evolve, each one proceeds from a preceding one.

One may ask: 'You have explained the characteristics of Intellect. What are those of the Sentiment of self?' We reply in this verse:

XXIV. The Sentiment of self, it is the sentiment that such a thing pertains to me. From that proceed two sorts (of products): in the first place, the eleven organs, and in the second place, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ

Commentary.

'*The Sentiment of self...*' What are the characteristics of the Sentiment of self? 'This voice is mine, this touch is mine, this form, this taste, this odour are mine, this religious merit is mine and is agreeable to me': similar conceptions are called the Sentiment of self.

'*From that proceed two sorts...*', that is to say, from the Sentiment of self two sorts of products proceed. What are they?

'*In the first place, the eleven organs...*' The eleven organs and the five subtle elements have been explained higher up (v. XXII).

The definition of the Sentiment of self has just been given. The Sentiment of self is divided into three parts. What does each of them produce? We reply in this verse:

XXV. The eleven organs endowed with sattva *are produced by the Sentiment of self, in so far as* [*it is*] Modified; *the Sentiment of self, in so far as* [*it is*] the Source of the elements, *produces the five subtle elements endowed with* tamas; *in so far as* [*it is*] Radiant *it produces the two sorts.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The eleven organs . . .*' When *sattva* predominates in the Intellect, the Sentiment of self proceeds from it, and *rajas* and *tamas* remain hidden. The Sentiment of self endowed with *sattva* is called by the Sages the 'Modified' (*vaikṛta*). It is the modified Sentiment of self which produces the eleven organs. How can that be? Because, when *sattva* predominates, it is capable of conceiving (*word for word*:

holding) its appropriate objects, to become lightening, illuminating, purifying. That is why the eleven organs produced by it are called ' endowed with *sattva* ' (*sāttvika*).

' *In so far as* [*it is*] *the Source of the elements . . .*' If *tamas* predominates in the Intellect, then the Sentiment of self is produced, *sattva* and *rajas* remaining hidden. As the Sentiment of self is endowed with *tamas*, it is called by the Sages the ' Source of the elements ' (*bhūtādi*). It is this Sentiment of self which produces the five subtle elements ; that is why the five subtle elements and the five gross elements are endowed with *tamas*.

' *In so far as* [*it is*] *Radiant . . .*' If *rajas* predominates in the Intellect, the Sentiment of self proceeds from it, *sattva* and *tamas* remaining hidden. This Sentiment of self is endowed with *rajas*. That is why the Sages call it the ' Radiant ' (*taijasa*). This Sentiment of self produces the two sorts, that is to say, the eleven organs, and the five subtle elements, etc. In producing these organs, the modified Sentiment of self, endowed with *sattva*, has for concomitant, the ' Radiant.' How is that ? Because, the ' Radiant ' is active, while the 'Modified' Sentiment of self, endowed with *sattva* is inactive. That is why the Sentiment of self, when it produces the eleven organs, is necessarily accompanied by the ' Radiant.' The ' Source of the elements ' too, in producing the five subtle elements, has necessarily the ' Radiant ' for concomitant. How is that ? Because, the Sentiment of self endowed with *tamas* is passive, while the ' Radiant ' is active. Thus, the Radiant Sentiment' of self is capable of producing the eleven organs (on the one hand) and the five subtle elements (on the other). That is why one says that the ' Radiant' makes the two sorts originate.

One may ask: ' You have explained that the Sentiment of self, endowed with *sattva*, produces the eleven organs. But what are they ?' We reply by these lines :

XXVI. The ears, the skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose are called the five organs of sense ; the tongue [*speech*], *the hands, the feet, the organ of generation and the anus are the five organs of action.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *The ears, the skin . . .*' (these organs), why are they called ' organs of sense '? They can perceive sound, form, etc ; that is why they are called ' organs of sense.'

' *The tongue* (*speech*), *the hands, the feet . . .*' Because these five organs are the instruments of action, the sages of antiquity have called them the five ' organs of action.'

One will ask: 'How do these ten organs discharge their respective functions?' The organ of hearing proceeds from the subtle element of sound, and is related in its nature to the gross element, ether; it perceives, then, sounds alone. The organ of touch (the skin) proceeds from the subtle element of touch, and is related in its nature to the gross element, air; it perceives, then, contact alone. Even so, the eyes are produced by subtle form, and are related in their nature to the five gross elements; they perceive, then, forms alone. The tongue comes from the subtle element of taste; it is related in its nature to water, and perceives savour alone. The nose comes from the subtle element of odour, and is related to the gross element, earth; it perceives, then, odours alone. The five organs of action have five functions. The organ of speech, combined with the organs of sense, is capable of articulating names, phrases, and letters (of the alphabet). The hands, combined with the organs of sense, are capable of taking, holding, etc., or accomplishing any mechanical action whatsoever. The feet, united to the organs of sense, can march together on a road, ascending or descending. The organ of generation, united to the organs of sense can procure (sensual) pleasure, and give birth to children. The anus, united to the organs of sense, can evacuate excrement. That is why one speaks of 'the ten organs.'

One may ask: 'What is the Manas?' We reply in this verse:

XXVII. Manas *is that which discerns. One says that that organ is of two sorts: it is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand).*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Manas is that which discerns.*' This organ passes as being of two sorts; discernment is its nature. How can it be thus? Manas is called an organ of sense, when it unites itself with the organs of sense; but it is called an organ of action, when it unites itself with the organs of action; for, the Manas is capable of discerning the functions of the two classes of organs. It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time. Why does one call it an organ? Because it resembles the ten other organs. The ten organs are produced by the 'Modified' [*vaikṛta*] Sentiment of self; even so the Manas. Its function is the same as theirs, for what they do, the Manas does that too. That is why one calls it an organ.—One may ask: 'The actions of the organs differ from one another. The organ, Manas, has it a special function?' Reply: 'Discernment is

its function. Imagine that a man apprehends that in a certain place there is treasure or food; he takes the resolution to proceed to that place, in order to obtain an excellent repast and riches. Such discernments or judgments are the special function of Manas. As it resembles thus the ten other organs in its mode of production [and] in its function, and because it possesses a special faculty, to wit, discernment, Manas is considered an organ. That is why one reckons eleven organs'.—One may ask: 'What is the agent productive of them all? If you wish to know why I have this doubt, I will tell you that I have put that question to you, because the opinions of sages differ on that. Some attribute actions to Spirit, others to the Lord (Īśvara) or to a material being. Opinions differing thus, each from the rest, I have had this doubt. The eleven organs ought certainly to be produced by a conscious (cause). Why? Because, the eleven organs are capable of seizing the eleven objects; but Nature, Mahat and the Sentiment of self are unconscious, and cannot have such a capacity (of production). This verse is found in the work of the Lokāyatas: 'What produces the white colour of the haṃsas, the green colour of the parrots, and the variegated colour of the peacocks, it is from that that I too am created'.[1] I have, then, uncertainty on the origin of the eleven organs'. I reply: 'As for the opinion that you have just mentioned, neither Spirit nor Īśvara is the productive agent; nor is there a special dharma, which may be called "Being". Then, nothing that you have just indicated can produce the eleven organs. What, then, is their origin?'

'*It is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas (on the one hand) and according to external differences (on the other hand)*'. The three guṇas, in company with the Sentiment of self, develop the eleven organs, according to the will of Spirit.[2] What is the will of Spirit? The objects of the organs are not identical, each with the rest; by these eleven organs, one can apprehend their (eleven) respective objects, for, a single organ cannot apprehend them all at the same time. There is the reason for the difference of the eleven organs. You imagine further that something unconscious cannot produce different things; but that is not correct, for, we see that an unconscious thing can be endowed with several faculties. That will be explained further on in this treatise (v. LVII): 'It is to nourish the calf that milk comes from the unconscious cow; in the same fashion, it is to deliver Spirit that the unconscious produces the

[1] This verse, extracted from a treatise of the Lokāyatas, recurs in the commentary on v. LXI, with an insignificant difference. In his v. LXI, Gauḍapāda has an expression, which certainly forms part of our verse:
kena śuklīkṛtā haṃsā mayūrāḥ kena citritāḥ.

[2] . . . . It may be that one ought to translate—'of their own will'. [This might have made better sense.]

organs'. That is why the three guṇas, though being unconscious, can produce the eleven organs.—One will ask: 'We know now that the eleven organs proceed from the Sentiment of self, but the place of each differs. Who has made them thus? For example, the eyes, placed above, are capable of seeing a form at a distance. The ears, placed one on each side, are capable of hearing a sound from a-far. The nose, situated by itself [prominently ?] is capable of sensing an odour that approaches it. The tongue, in the mouth, receives the taste that approaches it. The skin of the body senses all that touches it. Further, the tongue, placed in the mouth, can articulate names, phrases and letters (*vyañjana*). The hands, at the left and at the right, manipulate objects. The feet, at the lower extremity, march forwards or backwards. The two other organs are hidden to view, so that no one may see them. They effect excretion and pleasure. The (eleventh) organ, the Manas, has no definite place, and is capable of discernment. Who has arranged all this in this manner? Is it Spirit or Īśvara or a Special Being?' Reply: 'Neither Spirit nor Īśvara is the cause thereof. The true cause, it is Nature.' Nature produces the three guṇas, and the Sentiment of self, which, in its turn, evolves, according to the will of Spirit (or else: according to its own will; see note on the last page). It is by the three guṇas that the different organs receive their respective places. That is why one says that the Manas '*is modified according to the variations of the three guṇas, and according to external differences*'. Among the organs, there are those, which apprehend objects close by, while others perceive things from a-far. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger; (2) to protect the body. 'To avoid danger' (relates to the eyes and ears, which) in seeing and hearing from a-far, avoid the danger. 'To protect the body' (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects.—One may ask: 'What do these eleven organs do?' We reply in this verse:

XXVIII. The function of the five organs of perception is uniquely to perceive objects, colours, etc.; to speak, hold, march, enjoy, evacuate, those are the functions of the five organs of action.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Uniquely to perceive objects ...*' The eyes act only to see forms, and that is the function of the eyes. It is only a perception incapable of discernment or handling. The other organs too act only on their respective objects. The organs of perception illumine the objects,

while the organs of action utilise them. We have explained the functions of the intellectual organs, and we proceed to the organs of action. To speak is the function of the tongue, to handle that of the hands, to march that of the feet, to generate and effect pleasure that of the organ of generation, to evacuate that of the anus. We have explained the functions of the organs of action. We shall pass on to the objects (*viṣaya*), and the functions (*vṛtti*) of Mahat (the Intellect), of the Sentiment of self, and of the Manas.

XXIX. The three (principles) have their characteristics for [their] functions. The sphere (of activity), is not the same for the thirteen (organs). The functions common to all the organs are the five vital airs, prāṇa *and the others.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The three (principles) have for functions. . . .*' Determinative knowledge is characteristic of the Mahat; that characteristic is at the same time its function. The consideration of self is the characteristic of the Sentiment of self, and is at the same time its function. Discernment is the characteristic and the function of the Manas.

'*The sphere of activity is not the same for the thirteen (organs)*'. The ten (external) organs have different spheres of action; and the three (internal) organs, the Mahat, the Sentiment of self, and the Manas, have for characteristics their functions. That is why it is said that the sphere of action is not the same (for all).

'*The functions common to all the organs . . .*' When the function special to each organ manifests itself, we know that there ought to be a function common to all. The functions special to each organ are similar to the wife of a man, while the function common to all is similar to a woman-servant, who has many masters. What is that common function?

'*The five vital airs . . .*' (1) prāṇa,[1] (2) apāna,[2] (3) udāna,[3] (4) vyāna,[4] (5) samāna;[5] their functions are common to all the organs. *Prāṇa* draws the external object (air) through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils; that is its function. The statement: 'I hold myself erect, I walk' is the function of this vital air. By

[1] . . . *þo-na*, 'respiration, ordinary inspiration and expiration.'
[2] . . . *a-þo-na*, 'the descending air, the air which acts in the lower parts.'
[3] . . . *yeou-t'o-na*, 'the ascending air, the vital air which causes the pulsation of the arteries, from the navel up to the head.'
[4] . . . *þ'o-na*, 'the air which diffuses itself, by which the divisions and internal diffusions are accomplished.'
[5] . . . *so-mo-na*, 'the collecting air, which conducts and distributes nourishment etc., equally through the body.'

which organ is it governed? It is a function common to all the thirteen organs. Thus, a bird, which bestirs itself in a cage, moves the cage; even so, when the air, prāṇa, bestirs itself, the thirteen organs are put in motion too. There is a function common to all. *Apāna* makes us tremble and flee when we see something which inspires fear. When that air predominates, man becomes timorous. *Udāna* inspires us with pride; thus, when some one climbs a high mountain, he feels that he is superior to others, and that he has an exceptional capacity. When that air predominates, one becomes proud. The assertion: 'I am superior, I am rich' is the function of udāna. *Vyāna* expands in the body, but ends with abandoning the body. When that air predominates, it makes Spirit [the soul?] abandon the body,[1] and feel unhappy. If it goes out gradually, each limb becomes as if dead, and if it quits the body entirely, the man dies. *Samāna*, situated in the heart, is capable of sustaining and controlling the body; that is its function. When that air predominates, man becomes avaricious, and seeks riches and companions (*sic!*). The actions of the five vital airs are the common functions of the thirteen organs.

We have explained the functions, special and general; we pass on to speak of the function entering into action simultaneously and in succession. The verse says:

XXX. The Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the Manas and the organs act either simultaneously, or in succession, in regard to visible objects. As for invisible objects, the function of the three (internal organs) acts in succession to (the action of) an (external) organ.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The Intellect, etc., act either simultaneously or in succession, in regard to visible objects*'. As for visible forms, the Mahat, the Sentiment of self and the Manas all act simultaneously to apprehend an object. Even so, the (nine) other organs. The four (activities) acting simultaneously realise an object. '*In succession*'. Let us suppose a man who walks along a road; he perceives an erect object, and doubts if it is a man or a wooden post; but when he sees birds alighting on it, or a liana which enlaces it, or a gazelle which approaches it, he concludes that it is a post; on the contrary, if he sees a robe that stirs itself, or (limbs) contracting or expanding themselves, then

[1] Word for word: 'makes *man* abandon *the other*'. I think that *man* designates here *pumān* or *puruṣa*, and that *the other* designates Nature in the corporeal form.

he knows with certainty that it is a man.[1] Even so, the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the Manas and the organs act gradually. That is for what is seen by the eyes ; it is the same for what is perceived by the ears and the other organs.

'*As for invisible objects, their function acts in succession to an (external) organ*'. We have explained the successive action of the internal organs, entering into action in the wake of an (external organ), in regard to visible objects. Now, we pass on to treat the same subject, in the case where the question is about invisible objects. It is said in a verse: 'At the end of the *Yuga*, there will be men, who in their error and their perversity, will meditate on the Buddha, the Law and the Community.[2] Themselves perverse, they will gain over (to their perverse ideas) their relatives, their friends and their acquaintances. Themselves opening the road to the four evil ways (durgati : apāya), they will enter therein with the others.' As the past, so the future. By the organ of hearing, the three categories (Intellect, Sentiment of self and Manas) enter into action one after another. Thus, their function enters into action, in succession to an external organ.—One may ask: 'These thirteen organs are unconscious, and if they do not depend on Spirit or Īśvara, how can they apprehend their respective objects ?' We reply in this verse :

XXXI. The thirteen organs are capable of acquitting themselves of their appropriate functions, without being put in action by another thing.[3] *The will of Spirit is the cause ; there is not any other instigator.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The thirteen organs are capable of acquitting themselves*'. We have explained higher up that, in our school, neither Spirit nor Īśvara is considered an agent. That is why the thirteen organs acquit themselves of their functions by themselves, according to their respective spheres of action, without being put in action by another thing. A brāhmin engaged in brahmacaryā apprehends that in a certain place there is a master of the Vedas who is ready to teach, and [who is] surrounded by disciples who study under him, according to their desire ; he decides that he will go to study under him. That

[1] The example of the man and the post will appear again under v. XLVI. *Cf.* Alberuni, I, 84, and Garbe, *Sāṁkhyaphilosophie*, p. 65. See higher up, in the Introduction, my discussion of the parables employed in this text.

[2] The mention of the Ratnatrayam is curious ; the Japanese commentators say that this verse is not Buddhistic.

[3] Paramārtha seems to have ill understood *parasparākūta* 'mutual impulsion'. He says just the contrary.

determinate knowledge is the function of the Mahat. The Sentiment of self, seizing the intention of the Mahat, thinks thus: 'I go to provide myself with all the school-equipment that a brāhmin student ought to possess, so that my soul may not be distracted'. The Manas accepts the will of the Sentiment of self, and discusses thus: 'What Veda shall I study first: Shall I study the Sāma-Veda or the Yajur-Veda or the Ṛg-Veda?' The external organs, seizing the determination of the Manas, acquit themselves of their respective functions, that is to say, the eye sees the road, the ear hears the others talk, the hand holds the water-pot, and the feet march. Thus, a chief of brigands gives an order and says: 'To go or to come, for you to advance or for you to stop, you ought to obey my command'; and the troop of brigands obeys his orders. It is the same with the organs. The Intellect resembles the chief of the brigands, and the other organs, similar to the band of brigands, know the intentions of the Intellect, and acquit themselves of their appropriate functions.—One may ask: 'Each one of the thirteen organs seizes the objects which present themselves before it. Does it do this for itself or for another?' Reply:

'*The will of Spirit is the cause; there is not any other instigator*'. This has been already explained (v. XXI). The affairs of the Spirit ought to be executed and it is for that that the three guṇas produce the organs, which seize the different objects in such a manner as to manifest (the will) of Spirit. But where do you find an agent, if you assert that all the organs are unconscious? There is no agent, besides Īśvara, who can come in their midst to make them act. There are only Spirit and Nature, which unite themselves to operate together. Spirit has this will: 'You have to manifest yourself, and find for me a solitary existence'. To obey this will of Spirit, the three guṇas produce all the organs. It is in accord with the will of Spirit that each one acquits itself of its appropriate function; besides the will of Spirit, there is not any other instigator.—One may ask: 'Among the twenty-four principles, how many can be called organs?' We reply in this verse:

XXXII. The organs are to the number of thirteen, and are capable of drawing, holding, manifesting. The effect is of ten kinds: It is what is to be drawn, held, manifested.

Sānskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The organs are to the number of thirteen*'. The 'organs' of which there is often question in this treatise are of thirteen kinds alone. They are the five organs of sense, the five organs of action,

and the three internal organs—the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, and the Manas. What functions pertain to the thirteen organs? They are capable of *drawing, holding, and manifesting.*

'*The effect is of ten kinds*'... The five objects, sound and the rest, and the five actions, speech and the rest, those are the ten effects to produce. They are divided into three classes: (1) what [there] is to draw; (2) what [there] is to manifest; (3) what [there] is to hold. Among the thirteen organs, it is to the internal organs that what there is to draw belongs, to the five senses that what there is to manifest belongs, and to the five organs of action that what there is to hold belongs[1] and it is because they have this triple effect that one calls them the 'thirteen organs'. Thus (the effect) is said to be of three kinds: what is to be drawn, what is to be held, and what is to be manifested.—One may ask: 'How many organs seize objects of the three times (past, present, future), and how many seize objects of the present alone?' We reply by this verse:

XXXIII. The internal organs are to the number three; the ten external organs are their objects. The external organs seize the objects of the time present, while the internal organs seize the objects of the three times.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The internl organs are to the number three*'. The Intellect, the Sentiment of self, and the Manas are called the 'internal organs'. They do not act directly on external objects, and, for that reason, one calls them 'internal'. They are the means by which the will of Spirit is executed, and it is for that one calls them 'organs'.

'*The ten external organs*'. The ten external organs are the five senses and the five organs of action. They are capable of seizing external objects directly; that is why one calls them 'external organs'.

'*Their objects*'. The ten (external) organs are considered the objects of the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, and the Manas. Just as a master makes his servants work, even so, the three (internal) organs employ the ten external organs.

'*The external organs seize the objects of the time present*'. The ten external organs have for objects the things of the time present.

[1] This repartition differs from that of Gauḍapāda, who assigns the *āharaṇa* and the *dhāraṇa* to the organs of action, and the *prakāśa* to the senses.

How do you know that? The ears seize only the present sounds, without hearing those of the past or the future. As the ears, so the nose and the others. The organ of speech, the tongue, is capable of speaking the actual language, which consists of words, phrases and letters, but it cannot articulate that of the past or the future. As the tongue, so the other four (organs of action).

'*The internal organs seize the objects of the three times.*' The Intellect, the Sentiment of self and the Manas act on objects of the three times. The Intellect realises a pot of water [that is] present; it realises in the same way an object of the past; for example, it represents to itself the kings of antiquity, Mūrdhāta [1] and the others. It realises, further, the future, for example, when it thinks: 'All men will perish'. So also is the Sentiment of self; it acts on the objects of the three times, saying: 'This is mine'. So also the Manas; it seizes the objects of the three times, that is to say, it looks in advance on the future and recalls the days past. That is why one says that the internal organs seize the objects of the three times.— 'How many organs seize specific objects and how many seize non-specific objects?' We reply in these lines:

XXXIV. Among the thirteen organs, the intellectual organs seize objects, specific and non-specific. The tongue (as organ of speech) has sounds alone as object; the four other (organs) act on the five objects.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Among the thirteen (organs) the intellectual organs seize. .*' Among the thirteen organs, there are five organs of sense, which are capable of seizing objects, specific and non-specific. 'Specific objects' are those which are endowed with the three guṇas; the 'non-specific objects' are endowed with only one guṇa. Thus, the five objects, sound, touch, form, taste, and odour, such as they exist in heaven, are non-specific, being equally endowed with *sattva*, and free from *rajas* and *tamas*. The five objects of the world of men are specific, being endowed with all the guṇas, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and produced by the co-operation of these guṇas. The intellectual organs of all the celestial beings seize non-specific objects, but those of human beings apprehend specific objects. Thus, it is said that they *seize objects, specific and non-specific.*

[1] . . . . 'the king born out of the top of the head'. His other name was Māndhāta (. . . Man-t'o-to). A Japanese commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* says that he was also called . . . P'ou-cha-t'o, but that is the name of his father: Upoṣada. Cf. *Divyāvadāna*, p. 210.

'*The tongue has sounds alone as object*' The tongue, divine or human, has sounds alone as objects; it is capable of articulating sounds, phrases and letters.

'*The four other organs act on the five objects*'. The hand, which is composed of the five objects, is capable of seizing the five objects, as when it seizes a water-bowl. As the hand, so the other organs (of action). These four organs being thus constituted by the five objects seize all the five objects.—There are still some other characteristics. We explain them in this verse:

XXXV. The Intellect (co-operating) with the (other) internal organs seizes all the objects. That is why the three (internal) organs master the gates, the (ten external) organs being the gates.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The Intellect . . . seizes all the objects*'. The Intellect operates always in concert with the Sentiment of self and the Manas; that is why it is said: '*the Intellect, with the other internal organs*'. It is thus capable of seizing the objects of the three regions (earth, sky, space), and of the three times; that is why it is said: '*it seizes all the objects*'.

'*That is why the three internal organs master the gates*'. The three organs, Intellect and the others, make themselves masters of all the gates. If the three co-operate with the organ of sight, the eye renders forms manifest, the other organs remaining inactive. The three unite themselves with an organ, and seize the objects of the three regions and of the three times; that is why it is said that they govern the ten organs.

'*The ten external organs being the gates*'. This means that the five senses and the five organs of action are opened or closed, according to the (will of) the three internal organs. If these are found in the eye, the gate of sight is open in such a fashion as to see objects before it; but the other gates are closed and can perceive nothing. Since they obey the others, the ten external organs are only gates, and not real organs. Thus the ten (external) organs co-operating with the three internal organs can perceive all the objects of the three worlds. Another verse says:

XXXVI. The organs are similar to a lamp; differing each from the rest, according to the guṇas, they illumine the objects of the three worlds, and transmit them to the Intellect, for the use of Spirit.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The organs are similar to a lamp*'. This means that the five senses, the five organs of action, the Sentiment of self and the Manas are similar to a lamp, which, remaining in a single place, equally illumines all objects. All these organs are capable of illuminating the objects of the three worlds; that is why it is said '*like a lamp*'.

'*Differing, each from the rest, according to the guṇas*'. They are not similar, each to the rest; the ear seizes sound, but not form; the eye seizes form, but not sound . . . the nose seizes odour alone, but not taste. Thus, the five organs of sense necessarily occupy themselves with different objects; that is why it is said that they 'differ, each from the rest'. It is the same with the organs of action; the tongue articulates words alone, but is not capable of any other function, etc. Even so, the Intellect does but conclude; the Sentiment of self forms only egoistic concepts; the Manas does but discern. That is why it is said that they differ 'each from the rest.' What is the meaning of 'difference'? The Sentiment of self is not similar [as] produced with [each of] the three guṇas. The five subtle elements and all the organs produced by the Sentiment of self are not similar. (There is the difference).

'*They illumine the objects of the three worlds and transmit them to the Intellect for the use of Spirit.*' The twelve[1] organs illumine the objects of the three worlds, which are all different, and transmit them to the individual. In the same way as the functionaries and the people of the realm transmit riches to the king,[2] so the twelve organs bring over all the objects to the Intellect, and the Intellect makes them seen by Spirit.—It is said '*for the use of Spirit*'. One may ask: 'Why do the organs, having illumined the objects, not themselves make them seen by Spirit?' The reply is in this verse:

XXXVII. The Intellect prepares all that Spirit enjoys, and, further, it makes it see later the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The Intellect prepares all that Spirit enjoys . . .*' The enjoyment or the activity of Spirit is not the same throughout. The enjoyment of the ten objects . . . and that of the eight powers differs according to

[1] All the texts, except the Corean, have 'thirteen' here, faultily.
[2] Vijñāna Bhikṣu gives a similar example (*Sāṁkhyapravacana-Bhāsya* II, 47).

place, be it in the human world, be it in heaven, be it among the animals. The ten external organs, that is to say, the five senses and the organs of action, render objects manifest and transmit them to the Intellect; the Intellect receives them to give them to Spirit, to the end that it may enjoy them. By that transmission, the Intellect makes Spirit enjoy (the objects) to its satisfaction and experiences pleasure therefrom, so long as it has not attained supreme knowledge.

'*Further it makes it see later the subtle difference . . .*' 'Later' means: 'When the supreme knowledge is born in it'. There is a distinction between Spirit and Nature, but this distinction cannot be seen by men who have not given themselves to saintly practices, and that is why one calls it 'subtle'. In so far as [it is] the 'gate-way' of this distinction, the Intellect alone, among the thirteen organs, can make it seen by Spirit. What is it to 'see'? The concern is to know that Spirit differs from Nature, the three guṇas, the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the eleven organs, the five subtle elements, the five gross elements and the body. It is the Intellect which teaches Spirit that distinction, and by that Spirit attains final Deliverance, as has been said higher up (v. II): 'He who knows the twenty-five (principles), wherever he may be found, by whatsoever path he may go, whether he have tresses of hair or whether he have only a tuft or whether he have a shaven head, that one is released, without any doubt'. The Intellect alone, then, is the true organ of Spirit.—One may ask: 'Which of the objects are specific and which are not specific? For, you have said in a preceding verse (v. XXXIV) that all organs seize equally objects, specific and non-specific.' We reply in this verse:

XXXVIII. The five subtle elements are non-specific, from them proceed the five gross elements, which are specific, that is to say, tranquil, redoubtable, oppressive.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The five subtle elements are non-specific.*' If you ask the meaning of 'specific' and 'non-specific', we reply: 'From the Sentiment of self proceed the subtle elements, which are pure and tranquil, having *sattva* for the distinctive mark. These are the elementary objects (of perception) [of the gods; they are non-specific, exempt from *rajas* and *tamas*.'

'*From them proceed the five gross elements, which are specific.*' From the subtle element of sound proceeds the ether . . . . and, in the last place, from that of odour proceeds the earth. The five

elements thus produced are specific. What are the characteristics of the specific objects? They are (1) tranquil; (2) redoubtable; (3) oppressive. The five gross elements are the elementary objects (of perception) for men. What are the three characteristics of ether for example? Suppose that a rich man, who comes to taste the five sorts of pleasures in his harem, ascends a high pavilion to look on ethereal space; the element ether will procure him pleasure; then, the ether tranquillises; but suppose that on the high pavilion, he catches a cold; in that case, the ether produces pain (that is to say is redoubtable); suppose, again, a man who marches in a desert and who sees only ethereal space and not a village where he can stop; in that case, the ether oppresses. It is the same with the other elements.

XXXIX. The subtle (bodies), those which are born of a father and mother, and the distinctive gross (elements), that is the triple division (of bodies). Of these three bodies, the subtle is permanent; the other kinds are perishable. [1]

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The subtle bodies, those which are born of a father and mother and the distinctive gross (elements), that is the triple division.*' In the three worlds, the subtle body is created first, there are in it only the five subtle elements. The subtle body enters into the womb, where it grows by the mixture of the red and the white (śoṇita-śukra-miśra-bhāvena, 'by the mixture of the blood and the sperm'). The gross body (produced by the parents) grows, being refreshed and nourished by the food and drinks of six tastes,[2] absorbed by the mother. The alimentary channels of the mother and the embryo communicate; it is thus that the latter is nourished. In the same way as the root of a tree has openings to absorb the water which refreshes and nourishes the tree, so the taste of the food and the drink coming through the mother refreshes and nourishes the gross body. The form and the dimensions of the gross body are identical with those of the subtle body. The subtle body is called 'the internal', the gross body 'the external'. In the subtle body, all the characteristics and all the forms of man, the hands, the feet, the head, the face, the back, the abdomen are all present. The ṛṣis express themselves thus in the four Vedas: 'The gross body possesses six substances, three of which, the blood, the flesh, and the nerves (rudhira, māmsa,

[1] (Word for word: 'subject to decrepitude'.)
[2] Ṣaḍrasa; (1) madhura; (2) amla; (3) lavaṇa; (4) kaṭu; (5) tikta; (6) kaṣāya.

snāyu) come from the mother, and three—semen, the hairs, and the bones (śukra; majjā 'marrow'; the Chinese has 'hairs': asthi)—from the father. The body in which these six substances abide is the gross and external body, which develops the subtle internal body. The subtle body, having been developed by the gross body, has the five external elements for abode, as well at the moment of birth as afterwards. Thus, one builds for a royal prince a palace with several halls, and one says to him: 'Here thou wilt live, here thou wilt eat, here thou wilt sleep'. It is the same with Nature, which produces the five gross elements to give an abode to the subtle body and to the gross body: (1) The element ether is produced to serve as a place where no obstacle is encountered; (2) the element earth as a place of rest [abiding]; (3) the element water as the place for purity; (4) the element fire as the place for consumption; (5) the element air as the place for movement and dispersion. There is then in the body the triple division: (1) the subtle body; (2) that which is produced by the parents; (3) (that which results from) the union (of the elements). (The last) is subdivided, after its nature, into three: (1) tranquillising; (2) redoubtable; (3) oppressive.— One may say: 'Among these three categories, which are permanent, which are not that?' We reply:

'*Of these three (bodies), the subtle is permanent, the others are perishable*'. Among the three bodies, the subtle kind, which is formed by the five subtle elements, is the source of the body. When the gross body perishes the subtle body, if it is accompanied by vice (adharma), is reborn among one of the four classes: (1) quadrupeds; (2) winged beings; (3) serpents (that which marches on its chest = *uraga*); (4) beings which have horizontal form (those which march obliquely or sideways = *tiryañ*). If it is endowed with virtue (dharma), it is born in one of the four classes: (1) Brahmā; (2) the gods; (3) the master of the world (prajāpati); (4) men.[1] Thus the subtle bodies are permanent, and right until knowledge or aversion (for samsāra) is produced, they migrate through these eight places of birth. But when knowledge or aversion is born, they abandon the (gross) body and attain final Deliverance. That is why it is said that the subtle kind is durable, while the others, the gross kinds, perish and are not durable. At the moment of death, the subtle body abandons the gross body, which, having been produced by the parents, is eaten by the birds, or is abandoned to putrefaction or is consumed by fire. The subtle body of the ignorant turns without cessation in the existences. One may ask:

[1] Ref. the commentary on v. XLIV.

'You say that the body which is produced by the parents perishes; after that, what is the body which migrates through the existences?' We reply in these lines:

XL. The body, in its origin, is without obstruction (and permanent)[1]*; composed of the Mahat, the Sentiment of self and the five subtle elements, it migrates, without acting on the objects. It is influenced by the (mental) states and endowed with the mark of subtlety.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*The body in its origin, is without obstruction (and permanent).*' At the commencement, when nature evolves and produces the world, the subtle bodies are created first. From Nature is born the Intellect (Mahat), from the Intellect the Sentiment of self, and from the Sentiment of self the five subtle elements; these seven entities are called 'the subtle bodies'. What is the characteristic of a subtle body? It is similar to the form of the god Brahmā (in its subtlety), and after having perceived the objects (in its numerous existences), it attains final Deliverance. It is 'without obstruction'. The sages have said: 'whether it find itself in the world of animals, of men, or of gods, the subtle body does not encounter any obstacle on the part of mountains, rocks, walls, etc., because of its subtlety'. Further, it does not change. So long as it has not attained knowledge, it is never isolated (from the gross body); that is why one says that is durable.

'*Composed of the Mahat, the Sentiment of self, and the five subtle elements*'. Of how many substances is the subtle body composed? Of seven subtle substances. But as for the sixteen gross substances (the five gross elements and the eleven organs), what function does the subtle body exercise over them?

'*It migrates. . . .*'. The subtle body associated with the eleven organs migrates through the three regions, assuming one of the four births (of each species, of which there are two; see v. *XXXIX*).

'*Without acting on the objects.*' If it is separated from the eleven organs or the gross body produced by the parents, it is not capable of seizing the objects (to enjoy them).

'*It is influenced by the mental states and endowed with the mark of subtlety.*' The subtle body is influenced by the three states of being. The three states of being are explained lower down (v. *XLIII*). They are: (1) the state acquired by goodness; (2) the state obtained

[1] The word corresponding to the Sanskrit *niyatam* (permanent) is not found in the Chinese, but it is necessary to supply it, in accordance with the Commentary.

by Nature; (3) the state obtained by a product. These three states of being influence the subtle body.

'*The mark of subtlety.*' The subtle body migrates through the existences and it is what the sages alone see. (That is why one says it has the mark of subtlety.)

One may ask: 'The thirteen organs, in migrating through the existences, why do they assume the subtle body?' We reply in these lines:

XLI. As there is not any painting without a wall; as there is not a shadow without a post or other similar thing; thus, without a body composed of the five subtle elements, the thirteen (gross substances) would have no support.

citram yathā 'śrayam ṛte sthāṇvādibhyo yathā vinā chāyā |
tadvad vināviśeṣair [1] na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayam liṅgam ||

Commentary.

'*As there is not a painting without a wall . . . .*' We see that in this world the support and that which is supported go together and are never separated; thus the colours of a painting have a wall for support, and besides the wall, there is no other support for them. That is why '*the thirteen (gross substances) cannot subsist without the subtle body.*' Thus: without a post (which projects it), there is no support for the shadow; without fire, there is no light, without water no freshness, without air no touch, without ether no space for movement. Thus, without the subtle body, the gross forms have no support and cannot subsist. That is why it is said: '*Without a body composed of the five subtle elements, the thirteen (gross substances) would have no support.*' One may ask: 'With what aid does the subtle body migrate through the existences, in company with the thirteen (gross substances)?' We reply in these lines:

XLII. Having for motive the desire of Spirit, by reason of the cause and the consequence, according to the omnipresent power of Nature, it takes on varied forms (of existence), like an actor.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Having for motive the desire of Spirit.*' The desire of Spirit ought to be executed; that is why Nature evolves. This desire is of two sorts: at the commencement, Spirit desires to perceive the

[1] It is necessary to divide: *vinā-aviśeṣair* 'without the non-specific', that is to say, 'without the subtle elements'.

objects etc., and finally it desires to see the distinction between the three guṇas and Spirit. The spirits of the world of Brahmā, etc., can associate themselves with the objects (sound, etc.,) and can later be delivered entirely. Thus Nature evolves and produces the subtle body. Why is the subtle body subjected to transmigration ?

'*By reason of the cause and the consequence.*' The cause is eightfold : virtue, etc., as is explained lower down (v. *XLIII*). It is said in verse *XLIV*: 'By virtue one mounts to heaven, by vice one descends into the lower regions. By knowledge and aversion one gains final Deliverance ; bondage by their contrary.' In what manner are produced the cause and what depends on the cause (the consequence)? Reply :

'*According to the omnipresent power of Nature*'. Like a king who does what he wishes in his domain, Nature causes (the subtle body) to take a form in making it to be born among gods, men and animals. That is why it is said :

'*It takes on varied forms (of existence) like an actor.*' Like an actor who represents now a god, now a king, now a Nāga, now a demon, etc., the subtle body, associated with the thirteen (organs), enters now the womb of an elephant, of a horse, etc., now that of a divinity or of a human being, and becomes an animal, a god or a man.

One may ask : 'You have explained higher up (v. *XL*) that the thirteen organs influenced by the three states of being migrate through the existences. But what are the three states of being ?' We reply in these lines :

(*To be continued.*)

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responsible in their own way to editing and collating corrupted texts of the sacred books. Thus the Purāṇa contains many such valuable information, which if tackled in the right spirit, will shed much light on otherwise inexplicable problems and factors in the history of Ancient India. From the historical point of view this Purāṇa, as others, can remove the chronological difficulties of the history of Northern India during some centuries preceding and following the Christian era. The more do we exploit them, the more are we introduced to the culture and civilisation of Ancient India.

THE SUVARṆASAPTATI

(*Continued from Vol. IV, No. 1.*)

XLIII. The three states of being are the state acquired by goodness, the state acquired by Nature, and the state acquired by a product. One has seen that they depend on the internal organs ; those which depend on the subtle (body) are the kalala *and the others.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The three states of being are the state acquired by goodness . . . .*'. The three states of being comprehend all the objects. All the objects are of three sorts : (1) what is acquired by goodness ; (2) what is acquired by Nature ; (3) what is acquired by a product. '*Acquired by goodness :*' that was the case with the *ṛṣi* Kapila, who possessed the four faculties from his birth. These four faculties are : (1) virtue ; (2) knowledge ; (3) absence of passion ; (4) power. As it is by goodness that one obtains these four faculties, one calls them the faculties acquired by the good (done in a prior existence). What does '*acquired by Nature*' mean ? As is said in the Vedas, the Lord Brahmā had of yore four sons: (1) Sanaka ; (2) Sanandana ; (3) Sanātana ; (4) Santakumāra. These four sons, furnished with organs and their functions[1], had spontaneously, at the age of sixteen years, the four faculties all present: virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power. As in the case of a man who finds a treasure unexpectedly, the four conditions cannot be obtained by one cause ; that is why one calls them 'obtained by Nature'. '*Acquired by a product*'. The corporeal form of a master is called a product. Because it is the corporeal form of the master, the disciple approaches it with respect, listens to it and acquires knowledge therefrom ; by knowledge, one acquires absence of passion ; by absence of passion, virtue ; by virtue, the eight-fold power. Thus the four faculties are obtained by the corporeal form of the master ; that is why one says

[1] I do not see quite well what Paramārtha wishes to say by the phrase . . . . [rendered as : 'furnished with organs and their functions']. It ought, however, to translate a phrase parallel to this, found in the corresponding passage of Gauḍapāda : teṣām utpannakāryakāraṇānām śarīriṇām ṣoḍaśvarṣāṇām ete bhāvās catvāraḥ samutpannāḥ. [M. Takakusu shows that the components of the Chinese phrase used by Paramārtha correspond to the components of the above citation from Gauḍapāda. Cf. also Māṭhara: teṣām utpannakāryakāraṇānām śarīravatām ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇām evai 'te catvāro bhāvā akasmād evo 'tpannā].

that they are acquired by a product. These four faculties exercise their influence on the internal organs, the Mahat and the others, and they produce migration through existences. There are the four faculties and their contraries, eight in all. Where do these eight categories live? Reply :

'*One has seen that they depend on the internal organs*'. The internal organs are the Mahat and the others. Mahat possesses the eight faculties, that is to say, the four faculties produced by dharma and four produced by adharma live in the Intellect, as has been said higher up (v. XXIII): 'The determinative Intellect, that is Mahat; virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power are its characteristics, where it is affected by *sattva*. Their opposites (are its characteristics) where it is affected by *tamas*.' These eight sorts of conditions can be realised by the internal organs, and since these eight categories can be seen by a sage endowed with divine vision, one says 'One has seen . . . .'

'*Those which depend on the subtle body are the* kalala *and the others.*' Eight stages are spoken of: (1) kalala; (2) arbuda; (3) peśī; (4) ghana; (5) infancy; (6) adolescence; (7) youth; (8) old age. These eight stages are nourished by the four sorts of food; (1) the four stages (of the embryo) are nourished by the six sorts of food and drink absorbed by the mother; (2) infancy, by the milk of the mother; (3) adolescence, by the nourishment one procures it; (4) youth and old age, by independent absorption of nourishment. These eight stages owe their existence to the subtle body. The sixteen categories (dharma, 4; adharma, 4; kalala—old age, 8) influence the internal organs and cause migration through existences. One may ask: 'You have declared higher up (v. XLII) that, by reason of the cause and the consequence, the subtle body takes on varied forms, like a dramatic actor. What are "the cause" and "that which depends on the cause" (the consequence)?' We reply in these lines :

XLIV. By virtue one mounts to heaven, by vice one descends into the lower regions. By knowledge and aversion one gains final Deliverance; bondage by their contrary.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*By virtue . . .*' If in the world a man practises goodness, *yama* and *niyama* (v. XXIII) his subtle body will mount on high, in such a way that at a (fresh) birth, it will be re-born in one of the eight regions, that is to say, as (1) Brahmā; (2) master of the world (prajāpati); (3) god; (4) gandharva; (5) yakṣa; (6) rākṣasa;

(7) yamarāja; or (8) demon.[1] These eight regions can be gained by virtue. But if one practises the contrary of the ten good actions (*yama* and *niyama*), that is to say, if one gives oneself up to vice, the subtle body descends into the lower regions and is re-born in one of the five regions, that is to say, as (1) quadruped; (2) bird; (3) serpent; (4) amphibian;[2] or (5) being without movement (the vegetable and mineral kingdom). The five regions are the product of vice.

'*By knowledge and aversion, one gains final Deliverance.*' By the subtle body one gains knowledge, by knowledge aversion (for transmigration); because of the aversion the subtle body is abandoned and the true Self (Spirit) remains isolated. That is what one calls '*final Deliverance.*'

'*Bondage, by their contrary*'. The contrary of knowledge is called ignorance. Thus, a man says: 'I am to be pitied', or: 'I am lovable'; when he says: 'I am lovable,' that is the effect of the Sentiment of self. That is what one calls 'ignorance'. That ignorance enchains the body and obliges it to remain among men, gods or animals. This bondage is of three sorts: (1) bondage by Nature; (2) bondage by a product; (3) bondage by sacrificial gift. These three modes will be explained lower down (v. XLV). It is said (v. XLIII) 'by reason of the cause and the consequence'. Good actions are considered as being the cause and birth in the higher regions as the consequence; evil actions are the cause, and descent to the lower regions the consequence. Even so, knowledge and aversion being the cause, final Deliverance is the consequence; ignorance and attachment being the cause, bondage is the consequence. By the side of these four causes and the four consequences that we have just explained, there are four other causes and consequences; we pass on to expound them:—

XLV. Because of the absence of passion, there is absorption in Nature; because of passion tainted by rajas, *there is birth and death. Where there is power, there is absence of obstacle; where there is the contrary, there are obstacles.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Because of the absence of passion, there is absorption in Nature.*'— Suppose a brāhmin who leaves his family, studies the path, controls his eleven organs, rejects the eleven objects (of sense and of action)

[1] Nos. 3 and 7 differ in Gauḍapāda; god (*deva*) is probably for *devānām Indra* (see v. LIII,) commentary. [Māṭhara agrees with Gauḍapāda except for reading 'pitryam' in the place of 'saumyam', both possibly meaning the same, since the fathers belong to somaloka; both of them read 'aindram' thus supporting M. Takakusu's conjecture about the meaning of 'deva'.]

[2] See v. XXXIX, commentary.

and observes the ten laws of *yama* and *niyama*; he will be filled with aversion (for the world); by the aversion he will deliver himself of passion; but, not having knowledge of the twenty-five truths, he does not attain final Deliverance. When he dies, he will be resolved into the eight elements (of Nature): Nature, the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, and the five subtle elements. By the resolution into the eight elements of Nature, he does not attain Deliverance, though he may imagine himself to attain it. For, later, at the moment of transmigration, that man receives a-fresh a gross body in the three worlds. That is why one says that because of aversion (for the world), one is resolved into Nature. That is '*bondage by Nature*'.

'*Because of passion tainted by* rajas, *there is birth and death.*'—'Passion tainted by *rajas*'. Suppose a man who thinks thus: 'I have made great gifts, I have celebrated great sacrifices, I have served the gods and I have given *soma* to drink; I shall be happy in the future world.' By the desire tainted by *rajas* he will submit to a new birth in the region of Brahmā . . . or among the animals. That is '*bondage by sacrificial gift*'.

'*By power there is absence of obstacle.*'—'Power'; there are eight kinds (of powers) endowed with *rajas*: minuteness, lightness etc. Because of power, there are eight kinds of absence of obstacles in the world of the king Brahmā. The eight-fold power is associated with the Intellect; that is why one speaks in this case [of] *bondage by a product*'.

'*When there is the contrary, there are obstacles*'.—The contrary of power is impotence. Because of the impotence there are obstacles everywhere. Those obstacles too are a 'bondage by the product,' for they pertain also to the category of *tamas*.—This verse explains then the four causes and consequences. The absence of passion is called the cause and absorption in Nature the consequence; passion endowed with *rajas* is the cause, birth and death the consequence; power is the cause, absence of obstacle the consequence; impotence is the cause, obstacles the consequence.

One has then explained the sixteen products: the eight causes and the eight consequences. One may ask: 'As for the sixteen kinds of creation from causes and consequences, what are their constitutive elements?' We reply in these lines:

XLVI. Creation derives in its Nature from the Intellect; it is (of four sorts): doubt,[1] *incapacity, contentment and perfection. Considering the disparity of the* guṇas, *there are fifty divisions in the Intellect.*

[1] 'Doubt', but as the Sanskrit has 'viparyaya' it is perhaps necessary to read 'obstacle'; Gauḍapāda interprets, however, (as) 'saṃśaya.'

eṣa pratyayasargo[1] *viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyākhyaḥ |*
guṇavaiṣamyavimardāt[2] *tasya ca bhedās tu pañcāśat ||*

Commentary.

'*Creation derives in its nature from the Intellect*'.—Creation is (the aggregate) be it of the sixteen (causes and consequences), be it of eight consequences. The sixteen—the eight causes and the eight consequences—have the Intellect as the common base. The eight consequences are called the 'creation'; in this case, the eight causes are the base. That is why it is said that the sixteen kinds of creation have the Intellect as base. It has been said higher up (v. XXIII.): 'The determinative Intellect, that is Mahat; virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power are its characteristics, when it is affected by *sattva*. The opposites (are its characteristics), when it is affected by *tamas*.'

It is of four sorts : doubt, incapacity, contentment and perfection.—'The sixteen kinds of creation are further divided into four categories: (1) doubt; (2) incapacity; (3) contentment; (4) perfection. Here is an example: A brāhmin, with his four disciples, returns from a great kingdom in his country. On the way, before the rise of the sun, one of the disciples says to the master, 'Great master: I see an object on the way; I do not know if it is a post or a man having evil intentions.' This disciple has doubt on the subject of the post. The master says to the second disciple: 'Go to assure yourself if it is a man or a post.' This disciple, according to the words

[1] *Pratyayasarga*, 'intellectual creation'; *pratyaya* signifies 'notion' and *pratyayasarga* is 'creation of which one has only a notion' as opposed to the *bhūtasarga* 'the organic creation' that we perceive by our senses. Intellectual creation is of sixteen kinds:

Causes.	*Consequences.*
POSITIVE.	
1 virtue (dharma);	1 elevation (gamanam ūrdhvam);
2 knowledge (jñānam);	2 deliverance (mokṣa);
3 absence of passion (vairāgyam);	3 absorption (prakṛtilaya);
4 power (aiśvaryam);	4 absence of obstacle (avighāta).
NEGATIVE.	
5 vice (adharma);	5 degradation (gamanam adhastāt);
6 ignorance (ajñānam);	6 bondage (bandha);
7 passion (avairāgyam);	7 transmigration (saṃsāra);
8 impotence (anaiśvaryam);	8 obstacles (vighāta).

The Chinese text seems to admit of two interpretations of *pratyayasarga*; (1) the sixteen creations in their totality; (2) the eight creations of the consequence. In both cases, the Intellect is their base or their nature. This verse is not easy to comprehend.

[2] *Vimardāt* is rendered by Mr. Davies: 'out of hostile influence'; and by Mr. Garbe: 'since the guṇas find themselves against their dissimilarity.'

Paramārtha has: 'considering the disparity of the guṇas.' It seems that in his text he may have had a variant, perhaps *vimarśāt*, 'by the consideration of'; Gauḍapāda gives no clear explanation.

of the master, looks from afar, but does not go near, and says to his master: 'Great master, I am incapable of going near.' This second disciple is *incapable.* Then (the master) addresses himself to the third disciple: 'Go to see with care what that is.' The disciple looks at it and says: 'Great master, of what good is it to examine it now? At the rise of the sun a great caravan [1] will pass by here, to which we can attach ourselves.' This third one, though he be not still sure if it is a man or a post, does not worry about it (*contentment*). Then the master addresses himself to the fourth disciple: 'Go to examine the thing.' This one, who has a good vision, sees a liana embracing that object and some birds perching on it; he approaches it, touches it with his foot and returning towards his master, says to him: 'Great master, that object is a post.' The fourth disciple has then attained *perfection.*[2] The sixteen kinds of creation are thus grouped in four classes.

'*Considering the disparity of the* guṇas'.—There are three *guṇas*: *sattva, rajas, tamas.* They exclude one another; if *sattva* predominates, *rajas* and *tamas* are hidden; just as the rays of the sun hide the stars, fire etc.; and so too for *rajas* and *tamas.* Considering the disparity of the three *guṇas*, it is necessary to recognise fifty divisions of the Intellect. We pass on to explain these fifty divisions:

XLVII. There are five sorts of doubt and error and twenty-eight sorts of incapacity, because of the imperfection of the organs. Contentment is divided into nine, perfection into eight.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*There are five sorts of doubt and error.*' 'Doubt and error' have been explained higher up (v. XLVI). We now pass on to explain these five divisions. They are: (1) darkness (*tamas*); (2) stupidity (*moha*); (3) great stupidity (*mahāmoha*); (4) profound darkness (*tāmisra*); (5) blind darkness (*andhatāmisra*). Before explaining *incapacity*, we pass first to examine the five sorts of doubt:

XLVIII. Darknesses are considered as divided into eight kinds, stupidity into eight and great stupidity into ten, profound darknesses are divided into eighteen, even so the blind darknesses.

[1] The text has * * * ; that might signify 'a crowd of adherents of one sect'; my translation is hypothetical.

[2] This parable is given by Alberuni, I, 84. See also Garbe, *Sāṁkhyaphilosophie*, p. 65. It appears higher up, v. XXX, even as in Gauḍapāda. See my Introduction.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Darknesses are considered as divided into eight kinds.*' If a man attains absence of passion without having knowledge, he is absorbed in the eight primary elements, that is to say, Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the Manas and the five subtle elements. Though not having attained final Deliverance, that man thinks to have attained it, because he does not see the eight kinds of bondage. Not to see these eight kinds, that is what is called 'darkness'. 'Darkness' is the synonym of ignorance.

'*Stupidity into eight.*' We have explained higher up (v. XXIII) that power is of eight sorts. To these eight, gods etc. are bound by attachment and cannot attain final Deliverance; being bound by attachment to their power, they migrate through existences. That is why one says that stupidity is of eight kinds. The first eight (that is to say, the kinds of darkness) are called 'bondage by Nature,' and the last eight (that is to say, those of stupidity) 'bondage by a product'.

'*Great stupidity into ten*'. There are five subtle elements which are endowed with *sattva* and which serve as objects to the gods. The five (subtle) objects are associated with the five gross elements (which are the objects of men and animals, and which are) endowed with the three *guṇas*. It is to these ten objects that Brahmā, men, animals, etc. are bound by attachment; and they feel that there are not better objects beyond them. Because of that attachment, one realises neither knowledge nor the law of final Deliverance; one does only attach oneself to the objects, without seeking final Deliverance. That is whence comes the name of 'great stupidity'.

'*Profound darknesses are divided into eighteen.*' When the eight kinds of power and the ten objects fall into decadence, the poor man thinks thus: 'I am now poor, without power, and I have lost all the objects (in my power).' Thinking thus, he experiences eighteen kinds of misery. These miseries are called 'profound darkness.'

'*Even so, the blind darknesses*'. As has been said higher up, power is divided into eight kinds, and objects into ten. A man who possesses these eighteen kinds will think thus at the moment of his death: 'I have lost now the eight-fold power and the ten objects (of perception and action). The messengers from Hell come to bind me and hurry me near the king Yama.' Thinking thus, he experiences misery and he is incapable of listening to the doctrines of the Sāṁkhya. That is whence comes the appellation 'blind darkness'.

Thus, the five kinds (of doubt) are sub-divided a-fresh into sixty-two kinds. We now pass on to explain the divisions of incapacity:

XLIX. Destruction of the eleven organs and lesion of the Intellect are called 'incapacities'. Lesion of the Intellect is of seventeen kinds, by opposition to contentment (= 9) and to perfection (= 8).

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Destruction of the eleven organs*'. This means: deafness, blindness, loss of the olfactory organs, loss of the organ of taste, paralysis, insanity, aphasia, mutilation, infirmity, the state of a eunuch, constipation; these are the defects of the eleven organs. Why does one call that 'incapacity'? Because (where one is afflicted with these defects), one cannot hear . . . and one cannot attain final Deliverance. Thus, a deaf man—and, if you wish, give him another malady too—consults his good friend: 'I am miserable; what ought I to do?' The good friend tells him: 'Acquire the knowledge which the Sāṁkhya gives and thou wilt attain the exhaustion of misery, the shore of misery; thou wilt be delivered.' The man replies: 'I am incapable of acquiring the knowledge which the Sāṁkhya gives, for I shall not hear the words of the master; not hearing him speak, whence will knowledge come to me?' The case is the same for the blind and the others. Because of the destruction of the organs, they are not capable of acquiring knowledge; by that, they are incapable of attaining Deliverance.

'*Lesion of the Intellect is called incapacity.*' The seventeen kinds of lesion of the Intellect come to be explained ultimately.

'*By opposition to contentment and to perfection.*' These are the opposites of the nine divisions of contentment and the eight divisions of perfection, which are the lesions of Intellect. The eleven defects of the organs and the seventeen lesions of the Intellect are called the twenty-eight (incapacities). What are the nine divisions of contentment? We pass on to explain that in this verse:

L. There are four sorts of internal contentment: those connected with Nature, with the necessaries,[1] with time, and with destiny.[2] The external contentments are to the number of five, because they result from the renunciation of objects. In all, there are nine (contentments).

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*There are four sorts of internal contentments.*' 'Internal', because the four contentments are produced in the Intellect, the Sentiment of

[1] . . . 'to take', 'what ought to be taken', 'needs', 'the necessary' (upādāna).

[2] 'influence', 'the fruit of acts committed in prior existence' (bhāgya).

self and the Manas : contentment (1) relating to Nature ; (2) relating to needs ; (3) relating to time ; (4) relating to destiny. To make clear the four contentments, we give the following parable. Some brāhmins have renounced the world and left their families. Some one asks one of them : ' What knowledge have you, thanks to which, you have been able to renounce your family ? ' He replies : ' I know that Nature is the real cause of the three worlds and that is why I have become an ascetic.' This man knows only that Nature is the cause, but he does not know permanence and impermanence, knowledge and ignorance, possession of *guṇas* and lack of *guṇas*, universality and non-universality (of the twenty-five principles). Knowing only existence and its cause, he is content. Such a man does not attain Deliverance. One asks of the second brāhmin : ' What knowledge have you, thanks to which, you have been able to become an ascetic ? ' He replies : ' I know that Nature is the cause of the worlds and that the needs are the cause of Deliverance. Though Nature be the real cause, one does not attain Deliverance without the " necessaries " ; that is why I am provided with the necessary (objects). The " necessaries " are the objects of which the ascetics have need when they acquit themselves of their religious tasks. They are to the number of four : (1) the triple staff (tridaṇḍa) ; (2) the pot of water to wash (kamaṇḍalu) ; (3) the kāṣāya ; (4) the five beneficent (maṅgala) objects ; (*a*) the pouch of ashes ; (*b*) the solar crystal (perhaps, sūryakānta) ; (*c*) the sacred thread ; (*d*) the charms (magical words) ; (*e*) a long stalk of herb placed on the tuft of hair and called the beneficent herb (auspicious herb, kuśa). Those are the five objects necessary for the study of the way. They are called the beneficent objects, because they drive away impurity. With the three other objects, they form the eight necessary (objects). They make us attain Deliverance, and that is why I have left my family.' That is why the second contentment is called ' the contentment of the necessary.' For that reason (our man) is not capable of attaining Deliverance, for he knows only that Nature is the cause and does not know the rest. One asks of the third brāhmin : ' What is the knowledge on account of which you have become an ascetic ? ' He replies : ' What can Nature and the necessaries do ? I know that they cannot procure Deliverance (and I think that it will come with time). That is why I have desired to become an ascetic.' This third brāhmin cannot attain Deliverance any more [than the others]. Why ? Because he is ignorant of the sense of the twenty-five categories (padārthas). That is ' the contentment relating to time.' The same question is put to the fourth brāhmin ; he replies : ' Nature, the necessaries or time avail nothing ; it is only by destiny (that one is delivered). I know that one is delivered because of destiny, and that

is why I have become an ascetic.' No more has this man the knowledge; in consequence, he does not attain Deliverance. That is 'the contentment relating to destiny.' These four contentments are produced within [us].

'*The external contentments are to the number of five, because they result from the renunciation of objects.*' External contentment is of five kinds, according to the renunciation of the five objects. For example, a man seeing five brāhmins renounce their families, asks first of the first: 'What is the knowledge on account of which you have become an ascetic?' That man replies: 'In the world, there are five objects (of sense). All the occupations to acquire the objects (ārjana) are difficult to practise: tillage (kṛṣi), the business of a shepherd (pāśupatya), service of the king (sevā), commerce (vāṇijya); besides these occupations one may practise theft;[1] but this mode of acquiring objects cannot be practised, because it injures him who does it and others. Seeing these facts, I have thought to become an ascetic.' This fifth (counting the four of the preceding example) person will not attain Deliverance, because he has not true knowledge. One asks of the second: 'What law do you know on account of which etc.?' He replies: 'I know that one can acquire objects only if one looks for them. But when one has acquired the objects by means of tillage etc., then protection (rakṣaṇa) is difficult. Why? Because the five sorts of occupations are in conflict one with another. In protecting the acquired objects, one exposes oneself to injury to oneself and to others. Seeing that that protection gives birth to misery, I have renounced the acquired objects and I have become an ascetic.' No more does the sixth person attain Deliverance, because he does not have the true knowledge. Then the same question is put to the third, and he replies: 'I have been able to seek and obtain what I had not obtained; what I had obtained, I have protected it, in order not to lose it. But I have seen that the five objects, by the very fact that one enjoys them, diminish; when they diminish, one experiences a great misery therefrom. Seeing that they imply that fault of diminution (kṣaya), I have thought to become an ascetic.' No more will the third one attain Deliverance, because he does not have the true knowledge. The same question is put to the fourth. He replies: 'I have found the objects; those which I have not, I can obtain them; what I have obtained, I can protect it; what I have lost by diminution, I can find it a-fresh. Why have I become an ascetic? Because the five organs of sense are never satisfied and because they seek without cessation something better. Seeing that they imply this defect, I have sought to become an ascetic.' No more will this fourth one be delivered,

[1] Gauḍapāda has only *parigraha*, 'accepting alms'.

because he has not the true knowledge. Finally, the same question is addressed to the fifth, and he replies: 'I sought, I obtained, I preserved without loss; if there was loss, I sought the object a-fresh; I sought the better, and I obtained it. Why have I become an ascetic? Because the four (permitted) occupations by which one acquires the objects can injure others. If one does not injure others, one has no success in one's business. Tiller, he should cut the herbs and the trees; soldier, he should kill men; thief, he should cause loss to others; (merchant), he should lie. These evils and all the others from which the world suffers proceed from (the acquisition of) objects. Seeing that they imply that fault, I have sought to become an ascetic.' No more will the fifth one attain Deliverance, because he has only external aversion and he has not the true knowledge.

The four first [mentioned] sorts of contentment come from within the five others come from without; there are nine in all. To these nine sorts of contentment, the Sages have given nine names. As they are capable of clearing the dust and the impurity, the epithets of water are given to the nine contentments: (1) lubricating water; (2) moving water; (3) running water; (4) lake-water; (5) water [which has] well penetrated; (6) water easy to cross; (7) water which gushes well; (8) transparent water; (9) excellent and pure water.[1] The opposites of the nine kinds of contentment form the nine kinds of incapacity, to wit: non-lubricating water . . . up to: water [which is] not excellent and pure.

One may ask: 'The three categories (doubt, incapacity, contentment) differ from perfection. What is that last category?' We reply in this verse:

LI. Reasoning, hearing, reading, the three modes of preventing misery, what one obtains from friends and the effects of gifts, those are the eight kinds of perfection. The three first-mentioned acts are the curbs to perfection.

[1] Here are those which are the names in Gauḍapāda: (1) ambhas; (2) salilam; (3) ogha; (4) vṛṣṭi; (5) sutamas; (6) pāram; (7) sunetram; (8) nārīkam; (9) anuttamāmbhasikam. Fujii, the Japanese commentator, gives the following explanation: (1) 'lubricating water,' because *Nature* penetrates all, as water lubricates all; (2) 'moving', because by the *necessary* objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; (3) 'running', because with *time* a river joins the ocean; (4) 'lake-water', because the *influence* of the acts committed in other existences is like the water of the lake which the rain refills; (5) 'well penetrated', because one renounces the *acquisition* of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; (6) 'easily crossed' because one has not to occupy oneself any more with *protecting*, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; (7) 'which gushes well', for there is nothing to fear the *loss* of, like water which gushes without ceasing; (8) 'transparent,' for there is no more *attachment*; (9) 'excellent and pure', for not to *injure* others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Reasoning, hearing, reading . . . the effects of gifts, those are the eight kinds of perfection.*' These are the eight sorts of capacity by which one may accomplish the six practices (for which, see lower down 'the six sorts of contemplation'). Thus, a brāhmin, becoming an ascetic and following the path, thinks thus: 'What is it that is excellent? What is it that is true? Which is the final conclusion? By what practices does one attain the knowledge which manifests (the objects)?' Having reflected thus, he attains the knowledge; in him arises the knowledge of the twenty-five truths: Nature is different (from the other principles), the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs, the five gross elements are different one from another, and the true (paramātmā) is itself different from all the others. Because of that knowledge the six kinds of contemplation are born: (1) the contemplation of the defects of the five gross elements; in observing their defects, aversion is produced and one renounces these elements; this stage is called '*reasoning*'. (2) The contemplation of the defects of the eleven organs; when one sees their defects, aversion is produced and one renounces the organs; this stage is called '*holding*'. (3) The contemplation of the defects of the subtle elements: when one sees their defects, aversion is produced and one renounces the five subtle elements; this stage is called '*similitude*'. (4) Contemplation of the defects of the Sentiment of self and the eight kinds of power: when one sees their defects, aversion is produced and one renounces the Sentiment of self etc. This stage is called '*arrival*'. (5) The contemplation of the defects of the Intellect: when one sees its defects, aversion is produced and one renounces the intellect. This stage is called '*contraction*'. (6) The contemplation of the defects of Nature: when one sees its defects, aversion is produced, and one renounces Nature; this stage is called '*isolation*'. Thus, this brāhmin obtains Deliverance because of his reasoning. Perfection is obtained by reasoning, that is why one calls it 'perfection by reasoning'.

Having explained 'perfection by reasoning', we pass on to speak of 'perfection by hearing'. A brāhmin hears another read these words: 'Nature is different, the Intellect is different . . . the true itself is different.' Hearing that voice, he comprehends the twenty-five truths and he enters on the stage called 'reasoning', in which he renounces the five gross elements. Then, entering on the stage called 'holding', he renounces the eleven organs; entering on the stage called 'similitude', he renounces the five subtle elements; in the stage called 'arrival', he renounces the Sentiment of self etc.;

in the stage called 'contraction', he renounces the Intellect; finally, in the stage of 'absolute isolation', he renounces Nature, and that is what one calls final Deliverance.

Having explained 'perfection by hearing', we pass on to explain 'perfection by reading.' There are eight sorts of knowledge by which perfection is attained. Here is what a brāhmin does who comes to the house of his master: (1) he listens with joy; (2) he listens with exclusive attention; (3) he seizes (what is said); (4) he guards it in his memory; (5) he comprehends the principles; (6) he makes arguments; (7) he makes his choice; (8) he seizes the reality. Those are the eight constitutive parts of knowledge. By these constitutive parts of knowledge, one comprehends the sense of the twenty-five truths, and, entering on the six stages of contemplation, one attains final Deliverance.

'*The three modes of preventing misery.*' (1) Renunciation of internal miseries: a brāhmin suffers from internal miseries, headache etc., and goes to a physician to cure himself. Because of his internal misery, he desires to acquire knowledge; desiring to acquire the means of destroying the misery, he betakes himself to a master, from whom he obtains the eight constitutive parts of knowledge; he seizes the sense of the twenty-five truths; entering at last on the six stages of contemplation, he attains final Deliverance. That perfection has its origin in internal pain and one ought to consider the spiritual misery as identical with the corporeal misery. (2) Renunciation of external misery: a brāhmin suffers from an external pain, that is to say, caused by a man, a beast, a bird or even a mountain, a tree, a rock etc.; not being able to support the suffering, he desires to know the means of destroying the misery. He goes to a master, in whose house he practises the eight divisions (of knowledge); he seizes the sense of the twenty-five truths, and, entering on the six stages, he attains final Deliverance. That perfection has then its origin in external misery. (3) Renunciation of misery caused by natural phenomena: a brāhmin is afflicted by misery caused by a natural phenomenon, cold, heat, rain etc.; incapable of supporting it, he goes to a master to seek the eight-fold knowledge, by which he seizes the sense of the twenty-five truths: then, entering on the six stages of contemplation, he attains final Deliverance.

'*The perfection which one obtains from friends.*' In this case, knowledge is attained purely by means of the 'good friend' (kalyāṇamitra) and not by the eight constitutive parts of knowledge. Having gained the full knowledge, one gains final Deliverance.

'*The effects of gifts.*' A brāhmin is hated by others, and as he sees it, he becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate

knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself: 'In this village, there are no brāhmins; I can pass there my summer (varṣa)[1] retreat.' During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds. All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him: the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of Śakra, he says to the villagers: 'Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for me'. Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him; the rest he distributes to his fellow-disciples. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts.—These eight sorts of perfection are also called by the sages of antiquity: (1) crossing by oneself; (2) crossing well; (3) crossing all; (4) crossing with joy; (5) crossing with an excessive joy; (6) crossing with full joy; (7) crossing by love; (8) crossing by universal love.[2]

[**Sub-commentary**[3].—'*The sages of antiquity also call them*:' (1) 'Crossing by oneself.' A man of that class is very intelligent. By his own reasoning he obtains wisdom (*prajñā*)[4]. One calls that wisdom 'perfection by the act of crossing oneself,' because it is not due to the teaching by another. For that reason, the act of crossing by oneself is not (one) other than *prajñā*. As *prajñā* makes us escape from this shore and arrive at the other, one calls it 'that which crosses'. The act of arriving by crossing is called final Deliverance, that is to say, perfection. Relatively to its cause, *prajñā* is called 'that which crosses', and relatively to its effect it is called 'perfection'. This perfection by the act of crossing is obtained by our own reasoning; that is why one calls it 'crossing by oneself'. The sense of the seven other perfections is not different; the names alone differ.—(2) 'Crossing well'. *Prajñā*

[1] [The French reads 'retraite d'été (summer-retreat)'; but M. Takakusu inserts 'varṣa' within brackets after 'été'. One wonders what the Chinese text supports. It is difficult in any case to understand the equation of summer with the rainy season.]

[2] . . . . .Gauḍapāda gives the following names: (1) tāram; (2) sutāram; (3) tāratāram; (4) pramodam; (5) pramuditam; (6) pramodamānam; (7) ramyakam [mis-spelt in the *Bulletin* as vamyakam]; (8) sadāpramuditam.

[3] This *tīkā* seems to be by Paramārtha himself.

[4] ...*po-jou*, 'prajñā', 'wisdom'. The conception is the same as that of the *prajñāpāramitā*, 'the perfection of wisdom' of the Buddhists.

and Deliverance are obtained, be it by our own power, be it by that of another. A man of this (second) class has intellectual organs a little inferior [to the first] and he ought to profit by the instruction of another; but nevertheless his spirit is very active and by that he attains Deliverance. That is why one speaks of 'perfection by the act of crossing well'.—(3) 'Crossing all'. One calls (this class) 'crossing all,' because the men of this class, having intellectual organs doubly feeble, ought to rely uniquely [solely] on instruction by others.—(4) 'Crossing with joy.' A man of this class, suffering from an internal misery, headache or something else, goes to find the physician and asks him to treat it; he can thus escape for a certain time from internal misery. That is a joy for him. But he thinks later that it is not final Deliverance; knowing that final Deliverance is attained by absolute isolation, he betakes himself to a master of Sāṁkhya to learn *prajñā* and to attain Deliverance. Thus he experiences another joy. The expression 'crossing with joy' derives from the double joy which we have just explained.—(5) 'Crossing with an excessive joy.' A man of this class afflicted with internal and external miseries goes to seek a master, and asks him to cure him. Cured temporarily of the two sorts of misery, he experiences directly the double joy. But knowing that it is not yet final Deliverance, he goes to seek a master (of the Sāṁkhya). Having studied perfection, that is to say, the means of crossing, he experiences an excessive joy. That is why one speaks of 'the excessive joy'.—(6) 'Crossing with full joy'. A man of this class suffers from three sorts of misery: internal misery (headache etc.); external misery caused by the sword, the whip etc.; natural misery caused by the wind, rain, cold, heat etc. He goes to seek a master to find a remedy. When he is cured, he is in the state called 'full joy'. But knowing that it is not yet final Deliverance, he goes to seek a master (of the Sāṁkhya) for instructing himself; thus he attains perfection. That is why one says 'crossing with full joy'.—(7) 'Crossing by love'. By the love and the pity of the master a man learns how one realises perfection. Thus it is attained, thanks to the love of the master.—(8) 'Crossing by universal love'. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case 'crossing by universal love.']

The opposites of the eight classes of perfection are called 'the eight kinds of incapacity,' i. e., not crossing by oneself . . . universal non-love. There are then twenty-eight incapacities, eleven which are caused by the defects of the organs, and seventeen which are caused by the corruption of the Intellect. We have in this way

shown that doubt, contentment, incapacity, and perfection are subdivided into fifty categories in all.

[**Sub-commentary.**—The incapacities caused by the defects of the organs are to the number of eleven ; those produced by the corruption of the Intellect are to the number of seventeen ; that makes twenty-eight. The number fifty is reached (in adding to this number) the five doubts, the nine contentments and the eight perfections. That is their complete explanation.]

' *The three first-mentioned acts are the curbs to perfection.*' As an elephant in a rage, when it is well checked by the hook [goad], cannot move as it pleases, so a man, when he is checked by the five doubts, the twenty-eight incapacities or the nine contentments, cannot obtain true knowledge. Outside of true knowledge, there is not the eight-fold perfection ; that is why one says that ' the three first-mentioned acts are the curbs to perfection.' That is why one ought to reject doubt, incapacity and contentment to practise the eight sorts of perfection.

[**Sub-commentary.**—' *The three first-mentioned acts are the curbs to perfection.*' The five doubts, the twenty-eight incapacities and the nine contentments are the curbs of the elephant of the eight perfections. The eight perfections are capable of realising Deliverance, but because of the three curbs, they do not succeed in it. Even so a furious elephant is prevented from running as it pleases, because of the *aṅkuśa* [goad] which checks it. It is certainly by the eight perfections that one obtains true knowledge, but when they have for curb the three acts, one does not obtain true knowledge. One ought then to reject the three first-mentioned acts to be able to practise the eight sorts (of perfection).]

One may say : ' It has been explained higher up (v. XL) that the corporeal form, influenced by the states of being, migrates through the existences. There are two corporeal forms : (1) the subtle body which exists at the moment of conception ; (2) the body given by the parents. These two bodies, united to the eleven organs, are influenced by the eight states of being, and thus is caused migration through the existences. Here, there is a doubt. Which is born first, the corporeal form or the state of being (the disposition) ? '

[**Sub-commentary.**—The words, '*One may say . . .*' introduce a new question. First, one recapitulates the preceding exposition, then one puts the question of priority.—'*The corporeal form, influenced by the states of being, migrates . . .*' That has been explained higher up (v. XL). The states of being are of eight sorts : four virtues and four vices (v. XLIV). The four virtues are : (1) virtue ; (2) knowledge ; (3) absence of passion ; (4) power. The contraries of the four virtues form the four vices. These eight states are called the

states of being, for he who is under the influence of virtue can gain the path to heaven, while he who is under the influence of vice ought to fall into the path of men and of animals. 'What is it that they influence in the corporeal form?'—'*There are two corporeal forms.*' The aggregate of Nature, the Intellect, the Sentiment of self and the five subtle elements is called '*the subtle corporeal form.*' That which is produced by the five subtle elements, united to the eleven organs, is called '*the gross corporeal form.*'—Which has the priority in birth, the eight states of being or that which ought to be influenced by them, the two corporeal forms? That means to say: 'At first were there the eight states or were there at first the two corporeal forms?']

We reply in this verse:

LII. Without the states of being, there would not be the (subtle) form distinct; without the subtle form, there would be no state of being. There is what is called the form, and there is what is called the state of being; creation then is of two sorts.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Without the states of being, there would not be the (subtle) form distinct*'. Without the states of being the (subtle) corporeal form cannot be established, even as without heat there is no fire.

'*Without the subtle form, there would be no states of being*'. Without the subtle form, the states of being cannot be established even as without fire there is no heat. These two categories are associated as fire and heat, and co-operate like the two horns of a buffalo.

'*There is what is called the form and there is what is called the state of being; creation then is of two sorts*'. One gives two names to the products of Nature: (1) the form of creation; (2) the conditions of creation. At the moment of entering into life, (the product) possesses the two.

[**Sub-commentary.**—In the reply, two examples, fire and the horns, prove that priority pertains neither to the states of being nor to the corporeal form; the two are associated together like fire with heat, or they are of a simultaneous production like the two horns of a buffalo, which originate always at the same time. Even so, from the time that there exists the subtle corporeal form composed of Nature, the Intellect etc., there is necessarily also one of the eight states of being; they are never separated from the corporeal form. The gross body too, which is produced by the parents, is never separated from the states of being.]

One may ask: 'Is there only a double creation or is there still another name [mode]?' We reply: 'There is a third creation endowed with two series of four states of being and (its products) are called "the beings endowed with Sentiment"', as is said in this verse:

LIII. The way of the gods is divided into eight; the way of the brutes into five; the way of men is one. (All these beings) are called briefly 'beings endowed with sentiment'.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*The way of the gods is divided into eight*'. Here are the births: (1) King Brahmā; (2) the master of the world (Prajāpati); (3) the master of the devas (devānām Indra); (4) Gandharva; (5) Asura; (6) Yakṣa; (7) Rakṣas; (8) Piśāca.[1]

'*The way of the brutes is divided into five*'. The births are: (1) quadrupeds; (2) birds; (3) reptiles; (4) those which have a horizontal form; (5) those which have no movement.[2]

'*The way of men is one*'. For in the human world there exists only one class. The creation of beings endowed with sentiment is said to be divided into three categories; these three categories are: (1) gods, men and animals; (2) the subtle corporeal form; (3) the states of being.—One may ask: 'In the three worlds, what is it that predominates in each place?' We reply in this verse:

LIV. On high, sattva *predominates; at the root*, tamas *predominates; in the middle*, rajas *predominates; Brahmā is at the commencement and the pillar at the end.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*On high*, sattva *predominates*'. In the region of Brahmā etc., *sattva* predominates; there are also *rajas* and *tamas* there, but they are hidden by *sattva*. Brahmā and the other gods live in happiness.

'*At the root*, tamas *predominates*'. That is the lowest of the three creations; that is why one calls it 'that which is at the root'.

'*In the middle*, rajas *predominates*'. The human world is given up for the greatest part to *rajas*. *Sattva* and *tamas* though they exist too, are hidden by the predominance of *rajas*; it is thus that

[1] . . . 'sand-spirit'; cf. the Pāli *paṃsupiśāco*. This enumeration differs from those given in vv. XXXIX and XLIV. See my Introduction.

[2] Compare vv. XXXIX and XLIV Commentary.

men are given for the most part to misery. The way of men is called ' that of the middle ', because it is found in the middle of the three creations. Why is the last of all the creations called ' pillar '? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks etc. support the three worlds; that is why one calls it ' pillar '.

We have then minutely explained the creation of the (subtle) form, the creation of the states of being, and the creation of beings endowed with sentiment. The triple creation is the product of Nature; it is thus that the end of Nature is fulfilled, that is to say, that it produces the world and realises Deliverance.—One may ask: ' In the three worlds, among men, gods or animals, which is it that suffers, which is it that enjoys? Is it Nature or is it one of its products: the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the five subtle elements or the eleven organs etc.? Or is it Spirit? ' We reply in this verse:

LV. Among them, the conscious Spirit alone suffers the misery born of old age and death, so long as it is not separated from the corporeal form. That is why it is said briefly that it is (in) misery.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

' *Among them, the conscious Spirit alone suffers the misery born of old age and death* '. In the three worlds, there is misery caused by old age. (It manifests itself by) wrinkles, grey and falling hair, short respiration, the act of leaning on a staff and being disregarded by one's clan [family?]. Those are the miseries caused by old age. As for the miseries caused by death, here they are. Suppose a man who has acquired the eight powers or the five subtle elements or the five gross elements; at the hour of death that man is marked out [branded?] by Yama. The miseries which he suffers at that moment are called the miseries caused by death. Further, there are miseries of the intermediary period (between birth and death; cf. v. I and LI). It is the conscious Spirit which suffers these miseries; Nature and the gross body, being unconscious, do not suffer them. That is why it is said that Spirit ought to suffer misery and not Nature or the others.—One may ask: ' How much time does Spirit suffer misery? '

So long as it is not separated from the corporeal form. That is why it is said briefly that it is (in) misery.' So long as the Intellect etc. and the subtle form are not separated (from the Spirit), the Spirit suffers misery. When the subtle form is separated from the gross form, Spirit is delivered at one stroke, and, in the state of Deliverance, it does not suffer the miseries of which we have spoken.

So long as it has not renounced forms, subtle and gross, it cannot be delivered from misery ; that is why one says briefly (that associated with) forms, subtle and gross, it ought to be considered as overwhelmed by misery. One may ask : ' Is that the sole function of Spirit ? Or is there still another ? ' We reply in these lines :

LVI. There are the functions of Nature (explained), from the Intellect up to the five gross elements. She acts with a view to deliver the souls of the three worlds ; she performs the work of another as if it were her own work.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *There are the functions of Nature, from the Intellect up to the five gross elements.*' What is the subject of this verse ? The most important points of the seventy verses have been fully explained. How is that ? Because we have already rendered manifest the double function of Nature (bondage and final Deliverance) : (1) birth and death succeed one another ; in other words, Nature makes Spirit, associated with the matter of the three worlds, pass through a gradual development. First she produces the Intellect, from the Intellect the Sentiment of self, from the Sentiment of self the subtle elements, from the subtle elements the eleven organs and the five gross elements. In the body which consists of these twenty-three products, the Intellect is the first, and the five gross elements the last.'

' *She acts with a view to deliver the souls of all the three worlds ; she performs the work of another as if it were her own work.*' In order to deliver the souls, [who belong to] the way of the gods and to those of men and animals, she gradually causes the eight perfections (v. LI). When she makes (Spirit) see the difference between Nature and Spirit, she acquits herself of her double function to the profit of another and not for herself ; like a man who occupies himself in the affairs of his friend and not in his own, Nature acts for another (i.e. for Spirit) not for herself.

One may ask : ' You say that Nature, having realised the end of Spirit, is free to separate herself from Spirit. But Nature is unconscious and Spirit alone is reasonable [rational]. How can Nature intentionally make another associate itself with matter, migrate through the three worlds, and finish by being delivered ? If she is endowed with that intention, she is not unconscious.' We reply : ' In observing unconscious things, we find that they unite or separate themselves (i.e. act or cease to act), as is said in this verse :'

LVII. In order to nourish the calf, an unconscious (substance) becomes milk; thus is it with Nature, who, though unconscious, acts to deliver Spirit.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*In order to nourish the calf, an unconscious substance becomes milk.*' Thus, in this world, water and herbs, unconscious substances eaten by the cow, become (milk) to nourish the calf. In this case, milk is produced during [the period of] a year. But when the calf is older, capable of browsing on the herbs by itself, the cow, its mother, though absorbing herbs and water, gives no more milk.

'*Thus is it with Nature, who, though unconscious, acts to deliver Spirit.*' Unconscious Nature operates Deliverance. Nature and Spirit unite themselves and separate themselves; separated, they no more unite. Then, a verse says:

LVIII. As in the world the accomplishment of a work has for end the suppression of incertitude, so the actions of the non-evolved principle have for end the Deliverance of Spirit.

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*As in the world the accomplishment of a work has for end the suppression of incertitude.*' As in the world, a man who finds himself in incertitude bestirs himself on all sides to rid himself of that feeling, '*so the actions of the non-evolved principle have for end the Deliverance of Spirit.*' Because of Spirit, Nature is, so to say, in incertitude, and desires to act for the profit of Spirit; in the first place, she makes it seize the objects, that is to say, sound and others; in the second place, she makes it comprehend the difference between the three *guṇas* and Spirit. When the feeling of incertitude has been suppressed, Nature and Spirit can separate themselves, once for all. 'Non-evolved principle' (avyaktam) is another name for Nature, for she is above the domain of the organs of sense. For the same reason, one calls her also 'the obscure'.[1] If it be thus with her, how does one know that she exists? We know the real existence of Nature for the five reasons explained higher up; it is said in a preceding verse (v. XV): 'Because the specific classes are finite;

[1] . . . that is to say 'tamas'. For this name of *prakṛti*, cf. Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-philosophie*, p. 205; Max Müller, *Six Systems*, p. 322.

because there is homogeneity ; because there is production effectuated by energy ; because there is difference between cause and effect ; because there is no distinction in the form of the universe ': for these reasons it is said that Nature exists. Then, a verse says :

LIX. As an actor appears on the scene, and having represented some one, disappears, thus Nature retires after having obliged Spirit to manifest itself.[1]

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *As an actor appears on the scene, and having represented some one, disappears.*' An actor shows himself to the spectators, in dance and song ; when one has seen him and he has finished, he disappears behind the curtain. Even so Nature : she shows herself in the three worlds, bound be it to the Intellect, be it to the Sentiment of self, be it to the five organs of action, be it to the five gross elements, be it to the three *guṇas*. After having shown herself, she retires and ceases to suffer the three heats (miseries) [tāpa]. That is why it is said : ' *Thus Nature retires after having obliged Spirit to manifest itself.*'

One may ask : ' How many means does Nature possess to manifest herself ? ' We reply in this verse :

LX. By multiple means she (Nature) gives services to that (Spirit) which does not render them to her ; endowed with the guṇas, *she gives to that which has no* guṇas ; *she does the work of another without profit to herself.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

' *By multiple means she gives services to that which does not render them.*' The objects of sense, sound, touch, form, taste, odour etc. manifest themselves to Spirit. It realises, so to say, this fact in saying : ' I am different from these objects.' Spirit, having received these services from Nature, gives her nothing in return.

' *Endowed with the* guṇas, *she gives to that which has no* guṇas ; *she does the work of another without profit to herself.*' Nature is endowed with the three *guṇas* : *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* ; but Spirit has not these *guṇas*. Just as a man does good to his friends

[1] The text has . . . : ' having obliged Spirit to be itself manifested '. But it is probable that the translator has ill understood ' puruṣasya . . . ātmānam prakāśya ' : ' having shown herself to Spirit ' ; cf. v. XLII.

without awaiting a recompense, so Nature, from the beginning, does the work of Spirit, according to the will of that one, until it shall have attained Deliverance. Spirit never returns the service received: that is why it is said: 'She does the work of another without profit to herself.'—One may ask: 'Spirit after having seen Nature fully and adequately, finishes by attaining Deliverance. Is it that after that Spirit sees Nature only confusedly?' We reply in this verse:

LXI. Extremely delicate is Nature; I think there is nothing (as delicate) as she. 'I have now been seen': then she hides herself and does not show herself any more.

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Extremely delicate is Nature; I think nothing is (as delicate) as she.*' Thus in the world a man sees a woman endowed with excellent qualities; then he sees another who is most excellent of all; he thinks: 'This is the most excellent and the one who is without rival.' Even so Nature is the (most) delicate of the twenty-four principles. How do you know that? Because she does not bear the look (is invisible).

One may say: 'This opinion is not correct, because the isolation of Spirit does not come from [the fact] that it sees Nature. For, the master who considers Īśvara as the cause of the world says: "Spirit, ignorant and separated from Nature contents itself with miseries and with joys; Īśvara can send it into heaven or into hell."[1] Because of that, Nature cannot be liberated, even when Spirit has seen Nature. The delicacy of Nature cannot be proved. Then, the master who considers spontaneity as the cause (of the world) says "The opinion which asserts that in seeing Nature one obtains Deliverance is not correct, for Deliverance is obtained spontaneously; it has been said higher up (v. XXVII): what produces the white colour of the haṃsas, the green colour of the parrots, and the variegated colour of the peacocks, it is from that that I too am created. Thus spontaneity is the cause of the entire world; Deliverance is effectuated then spontaneously and not by Nature." Then, a master (who adheres to the theory of the Spirit) says: "It is not correct to say that in seeing Nature one obtains

[1] Gauḍapāda gives thus the original of this verse:
ajño jantur anīśo'yam ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ |
īśvaraprerito gacchet svargaṃ narakam eva vā ||
[The *Bulletin* version contains several misprints.]

Deliverance, for Deliverance is effectuated by means of the Spirit,[1] as is said in these lines: The hymns of the four Vedas exalt the souls (puruṣas) of the past and of the future who have power over life and death, whose acts have been accomplished, and are not repeated any more.[2] It is by that cause that Deliverance is effectuated and not by the act of seeing Nature." '

Replying to all, we say: 'You consider Īśvara as the cause, but your opinion is not correct. Why? Because he has no *guṇas*, while the world possesses them; cause and effect would then be dissimilar; for that reason Īśvara cannot be the cause. Nature alone is endowed with the three *guṇas*; as the world is endowed with them too, we know that Nature is the cause.

'For the same reason, Spirit ought not to be considered any more as being the cause, for it has no *guṇas*.

'It is not any more correct to consider spontaneity as the cause of the world, for it is beyond the domain of perception and inference. By perception we see first the cause and then the effect. By inference we avail ourselves of what has been seen by perception to calculate the past and the future that we know by this means.

'If you say that we can know it by *āptavacana* (that is to say, by the lines cited higher up), that is still incorrect, for the opinion that is expressed there is completely erroneous; it is not then an *āptavacana*.'

One may say: 'There are yet some other opinions. There are men who consider time as the cause; thus it is said in a verse: "Time matures all that exists, it destroys all that exists; when the world sleeps, time is awake; who can elude time?" [3] All things derive from time; that is why one attains Deliverance without the vision of Nature.'

We reply: 'The opinion which considers time as being the cause is erroneous, for time is not found among the three categories, Nature, its products and Spirit, which include all things that exist. Outside the three categories there is nothing; they do not include time; we know then that time does not exist. What one calls time

[1] The master who considers Spirit as the cause of deliverance belongs to the Vaiśeṣika school.

[2] The last phrase of the verse is not quite clear to me; one might translate also: 'who, having gone everywhere, go no more anywhere'. The Chinese has: . . . . The Japanese commentator says: 'who have accomplished their religious acts and who have to suffer no more misery on the earth'.

[3] The text of Gauḍapāda is:

kālaḥ pañcāsti bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate jagat |
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ ||

Paramārtha has read then *pacati* in the place of *pañcāsti*. [At least one edition of Gauḍapāda reads *pacati*. Māṭhara reads thus:

kālaḥ sṛjati bhūtānī kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ |
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam ||]

is the modality of a product; time past, that is a past product, and the present and the future are, even so, present and future products. We know then that "time" is only an epithet of products. For that reason, we consider Nature as being the true cause'. A man, who has acquired that true knowledge, comes to see Nature well and fully, after which she hides herself and separates herself from Spirit, operating thus the Deliverance of Spirit. That is why it has been said: 'Excessively delicate is Nature; I think there is nothing (as delicate) as she.'

One may ask: 'When Nature has been seen, why does she retire?' We reply:

'*"I have now been seen": then she hides herself and does not show herself any more.*' Just as a lady of a good family virtuous by nature, is covered with confusion and hides herself when a man has seen her unexpectedly, even so, Nature,[1] when Spirit has seen her well and fully, retires and hides herself, and Spirit rests completely isolated.

One may say: 'The men of the world, even sages, are accustomed to talk thus: "the Spirit is bound, the Spirit is delivered, the Spirit migrates through the existences." These words, are they correct or false?' We reply: 'They are false.' 'How do you know that?' It is said in this verse:

LXII. Spirit is not bound, is not delivered, does not migrate through the existences; Nature alone is bound, delivered, [*that*] *alone migrates.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Spirit is not bound, is not delivered.*' Spirit is not bound. How is that? Because it has not the three *guṇas*, because it is omnipresent, because it is not a product, because it is incapable of action. Enchainment takes place because of the possession of the three *guṇas*; it is subjected to 'natural bondage'.[2] (It is not bound), because it is omnipresent. In speaking of bondage, we distinguish *here* from *there*. What is *here* is not *there*; there is then bondage *here*. But for Spirit there is not *here* or *there* (since it is omnipresent); it is not then bound. (Spirit is not bound), because it is not a

[1] The example of the lady of good family (kulavadhū) is given in the *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 142 of the Calcutta edition; Garbe, *Mondschein*, p. 619. 'Kulavadhūvat' is also found in the *Sūtra*, III, 70.

[2] It is necessary to recall here the 'three bondages' enumerated in v. XLV: (1) bondage by Nature (prākṛta); (2) bondage by a product incidental (vaikārika); (3) bondage by sacrificial gift (dākṣaṇika).

product : the products—from the Intellect up to the five elements—pertain to Nature and not to Spirit; Spirit then is not subject to 'bondage by a product.' (Spirit is not bound), because it is inactive. Spirit is not an agent, it is then incapable of action. To offer gifts and all other actions are appropriate to Nature; Spirit then is not subject to 'natural bondage.' If Spirit is not bound, it follows of itself that it is not delivered. However, we say for convenience that Spirit itself is delivered.

'*It does not migrate through the existences.*' Spirit is omnipresent. Where could it migrate? To migrate would be to say : go there where one actually is not. But there is no place where Spirit may not be present; there is then no transmigration for it. Only a man who does not know this truth says that Spirit is bound, that it migrates. One may ask: 'If it is thus with it, what is it that is bound and that migrates?'

'*Nature alone is bound, delivered,* [*that*] *alone migrates.*' Nature is bound by the triple bondage : natural, incidental, ritual. The subtle body, which consists of the five subtle elements and which is united to the thirteen organs, is bound by the triple bondage and migrates through the three worlds. When one obtains the true knowledge, the triple bondage is suppressed, one is delivered from transmigration and one attains final Deliverance. That is why it is said that the three worlds act by the support of Nature. If then you say that Spirit is bound in the worlds or that it is delivered from death and birth, that is not correct. Another verse says:

LXIII. rūpaiḥ saptabhir eva tu badhnāty ātmānam ātmanā prakṛtiḥ |
sai'va ca puruṣārtham prati vimocayaty ekarūpeṇa ||

By seven modes (*v. LXVII*) *Nature binds herself; by one mode she delivers herself, in accordance with the desire of Spirit.*

Note.—This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the *Sūtra*, III, 73.

LXIV. }
Ch. LXIII. } *When one has meditated frequently and up to the end the sense of these truths, one obtains an infallible knowledge, pure and absolute, to wit : that there is no Me, that there is no Mine.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*When one has meditated frequently . . . the sense of these truths.*' The truths are the twenty-five principles of which we have often

spoken. 'Meditated frequently and up to the end': in the six processes of contemplation (see v. LI, commentary), these principles are often studied. 'Up to the end' means that the study is exhaustive.[1] By this means one attains knowledge. Because of that knowledge one destroys completely the three (false) ideas *completely*: 'that there is nothing,[2] that the Self [Me] exists, that Mine exists', and the five doubts (explained in v. XLVII). All the functions of all corporeal existences are caused by Nature; there is not 'Nothing', there is no Me, there is no Mine; because all pertain to Nature. By this practice, the knowledge becomes pure and absolute, and by that knowledge Spirit obtains final Deliverance.—One may ask: 'That knowledge, for what does it serve [of what service is it to] Spirit?' We reply:

LXV.
Ch. LXIV. *By that knowledge, (Nature) ceases to produce and finishes by abandoning her functions, in accordance with the desire of Spirit. Spirit looks at nature, as a man seated tranquilly looks at a play.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*By that knowledge (Nature) ceases to produce.*' By that true knowledge, Nature does not produce any more the Intellect, the Sentiment of self, the five subtle elements etc. It is said in a verse: 'Just as the decorticated rice sprouts no more in the water or in the earth, so Nature ceases to be prolific, when she is mastered by knowledge.'[3]

'*She finishes by abandoning her functions, in accordance with the desire of Spirit.*' After having acquitted herself of the two functions to the profit of Spirit—to make Spirit seize the objects; to show it the difference between Nature and Spirit,—she abandons all her functions.

'*Spirit looks at Nature, as a man seated tranquilly looks at a play.*' Just as the spectator of a play sits there tranquilly, so Spirit looks at Nature in all her functions without ever being moved and makes, so to say, this reflection: 'She binds all men, and she finishes by unbinding all men.'—One may ask: 'What does knowledge accomplish between Nature and Spirit?' We reply in this verse:

[1] The Chinese take *aparišeṣam* as an adverb and not as an adjective of *jñānam*.

[2] The first false idea, . . . , 'there is not', 'nothing' is strange. The Bombay edition of Wilson's text has *nāsti* in the place of *nāsmi*. But the act of isolating *nāsti* and making of it the first false idea is a misconstruction of Paramārtha's.

[3] This verse comes without doubt from the *Pātañjalayogasūtra*; the idea of it is also given in Alberuni, *Indica*, I, p. 55.

LXVI.
Ch. LXV. *'I have seen her' (says Spirit) and holds itself apart. 'I have been seen' (says Nature) and she retires to hide herself. Nature and Spirit may meet again, but there is no more creation, because there is need for it no more.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*" I have seen her " (says Spirit) and holds itself apart.*' In this world a man sees a play executed by different actresses; he thinks: 'I have seen them sufficiently', and he ceases to look at them. The actresses think: 'Our play has been seen', and they retire from the scene. Even so, after having seen Nature, Spirit ceases to look. Nature too holds herself apart, saying: 'I have been seen'. One may ask: 'Spirit, even like Nature, is omnipresent. When the one and the other are united, that state will endure for ever, and they will no more be disunited. How is it that that union does not cause the production of a body?' We reply:

'*Nature and Spirit may meet again, but there is no more creation, because there is need for it no more.*'—You affirm that Spirit and Nature are omnipresent, and that for that reason, they are united for ever. That is true in effect. But why then is there no more creation? Because there is no more need for a creation. The end of creation is double: (1) to make Spirit seize the objects; (2) to show to Spirit the distinct existence of Nature. This double end once accomplished, there is no more need for a creation.—One may ask: 'If it is thus with it, the end is uncertain, since the union of the two is its cause.' We reply: 'Because of the power of perfect knowledge, Spirit seeing the mature [elderly; rotten] state of Nature, is disgusted with her, and contents itself with looking at her.' Even if they united once again, it can no more result in creation. Thus a creditor and a debtor have relations together on the subject of the debt; but the debt paid, the two men have relations no more, though they may meet again; it is the same with Spirit and Nature.—One may ask: 'If by knowledge one gains final Deliverance, you who possess that knowledge and I who possess that knowledge, why are we two not yet delivered?' We reply in these two verses:

LXVII.
Ch. LXVI. *Because of perfect and full knowledge,* dharma *etc. have influence no more. Transmigration is arrested, like the body of the wheel (of the potter), the movement of which one interrupts.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*Because of perfect and full knowledge*, dharma *etc. have influence no more.*' 'Perfect knowledge' means the real knowledge of the twenty-five principles. 'Full knowledge' means the knowledge of the twenty-five principles without augmentation or diminution. By the power of that knowledge one destroys and parches the seven modes: (1) virtue; (2) vice; (3) ignorance; (4) absence of passion; (5) passion; (6) power; (7) impotence. Just as grains parched by fire germinate no more, even so the seven modes (sapta-rūpa), seized by knowledge, have no more influence. We other men migrate without cessation. This transmigration in the seven spheres [1] is caused by virtue and the other (modes) obtained in prior existences. But by reason of knowledge, these causes cease to bear their fruit. Just as, without an umbrella, one has no shade, so without an antecedent cause, there is no corporeal form. Then a man who possesses knowledge and on whom, for that reason, the acts committed in prior existences have no more influence, stops (in transmigration); like the wheel (of the potter) the movement of which one interrupts.

One may ask: '(But finally), having obtained knowledge, at what moment is one delivered?' We reply in this verse:—

LXVIII.
Ch. LXVII. } *When (Spirit) abandons the body and when, having shown the objects to it, Nature quits Spirit, the final and definitive* [2] *isolation is accomplished.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*When Spirit abandons the body.*' That is the moment when the influences of prior actions, virtue and vice, is exhausted, that is to say, just the moment when we quit this body. At this moment the earth element which is in our body returns to the general element of earth, the ether in us returns to the element ether, the five organs are absorbed by the five subtle elements, even so the Manas.

[1] These are the places corresponding to the 'consequences' enumerated in v. XLVI; it is naturally necessary to except final Deliverance therefrom.

[2] [In the Sanskrit, the same words 'aikāntika' and 'ātyantika' appear in v. I and v. LXVIII, indicating that what was sought has been found and that the quest is at an end. In the Chinese there seems to be a slight difference, judging from M. Takakusu's translation. The words used in v. I are 'ni defini ni definitif', 'neither definite (certain) nor final'; but in v. LXVIII, we find 'final' alternating with 'definitif', the latter word meaning nothing more than 'definite' to judge from the commentary. The difference is, perhaps, hardly significant].

'*Having shown the objects to it, Nature quits Spirit.*' That is to say, having fulfilled the double end—the creation of all and final Deliverance,—Nature quits Spirit. In the two cases, definitive and final isolation is accomplished. 'Definitive isolation' means: because of the true knowledge we reject the indefinite remedies and the opinions of the different schools. 'Final isolation' means: for that we abandon the chain of causes and effects taught in the four Vedas (cf. v. I), even the fruits promised for the absence of passion, fruits not caused by true knowledge. Final isolation is 'definitive' because it is not followed by another. 'Final' would be to say 'without end' (eternal). Isolation takes place in the two cases explained above.—One may ask: 'Of what service is the true knowledge?' We reply in these lines:—

LXIX.
Ch. LXVIII. } *That knowledge adapted to the end of Spirit (and which is) secret has been explained by the great* ṛṣi; *by it the production, the duration and the destruction of the world can be measured.*

SANSKRIT KĀRIKĀ.

Commentary.

'*That knowledge adapted to the end of Spirit.*' 'That knowledge' is the perfect knowledge of the twenty-five principles. 'Adapted to the end of Spirit': this end is isolation and Deliverance.

'(*That*) *secret* (*knowledge*) *has been explained by the great* ṛṣi.' 'Secret': that which is hidden by all sorts of erroneous opinions, that which is difficult to manifest, can be obtained only by a perfect master. That which is secret is that which can be transmitted to a brāhmin endowed with the five qualities, but not to any other; that is why one calls it 'secret'. What are the five qualities? (1) Good place of birth; (2) good family; (3) good conduct; (4) capacity; (5) desire to obtain that knowledge. Those are the qualities which make [one] fit to receive the Law; no one else is capable of it; that is why one calls that knowledge 'secret'.

'*Explained by the great* ṛṣi.' The principles have been explained one by one by the Sage Kapila—One may ask: 'In what inquiry do they serve?' Reply:

'*The production, duration, and destruction of the world can be measured by that knowledge.*' The 'world' is all that exists from Brahmā up to the pillar; for all that there is a creation, a duration and an end. Creation: Nature produces the Intellect etc., up to the five elements. Duration: this is all the time [during which] the subtle

body, influenced by the states of being, migrates through the three worlds. End: by means of the eight perfections (v. LI), (Spirit) rests for ever isolated. The conditions of the three (periods) can be manifested by that knowledge; since it manifests nothing outside of these three, one calls it absolute knowledge.—One may ask: 'From whom proceeds that knowledge?' We reply in this verse:

LXX.
Ch. LXIX. } *That excellent and beneficent knowledge has been communicated through compassion by the* muni, *first to Āsuri, who, in his turn, communicated it to Pañcaśikha.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*That excellent and beneficent knowledge*'. That knowledge was established for the first time before the four Vedas had appeared. It is by that knowledge that the four Vedas and all the religious schools have been established; that is why one calls it excellent (agrya). It is by that knowledge that Spirit is delivered from the triple misery, from the principal misery caused by the twenty-four (products), as well as from the triple bondage; by that is obtained isolation of Spirit or its Deliverance. That is why one says that that knowledge is 'beneficent'.

'*It has been communicated through compassion by the* muni.' Who has first possessed that knowledge? The great Sage Kapila possessed at his birth the four qualities, virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power. Having realised that knowledge, he explained it through compassion. Desiring that that knowledge should not be lost and that it should be communicated to another, he taught it through charity to Āsuri, who explained it, in his turn, to Pañcaśikha and to Vindhyāvāsa; Pañcaśikha and Vindhyāvāsa [1] treated that doctrine at full length, in sixty-thousand verses in all. The Sage Kapila explained it briefly to Āsuri as follows:

'At the first beginning there was nothing but darkness. In that darkness there was a "field of knowledge". The "field of knowledge" was the *puruṣa*. The puruṣa existed, but no knowledge existed. That is why one called (the puruṣa) "field". Then came evolution

[1] There is here a variant. Three texts out of four read: . . . 'In his turn, he explained it to Pañcaśikha and to Vindhyāvāsa; Pañcaśikha and Vindhyāvāsa have treated this doctrine at full length.' But the Korean text reads: . . . . 'In his turn, he explained it to Pañcaśikha and Pañcaśikha had treated this doctrine at full length.' The Korean text then does not speak of Vindhyāvāsa. Cf. my Introduction.

and modification; thus was originated primordial creation by evolution etc., up to final Deliverance'.[1] The Sage Āsuri, in his turn, explained that knowledge briefly and in identical terms to Pañcaśikha, who explained it at full length in sixty-thousand verses; thus the doctrine was transmitted up to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the brāhmin, whose family-name was Kauśika; that one explained the system in seventy verses, as is said in this verse:

LXXI.
Ch. LXX. } *Some disciples, coming one after another, transmitted the knowledge taught by the great Master. Īśvarakṛṣṇa expounded it briefly, knowing the fundamentals of the truth.*

Sanskrit Kārikā.

Commentary.

'*Some disciples, coming one after the other, transmitted the knowledge taught by the great Master.*' That knowledge came from Kapila to Āsuri, who transmitted it to Pañcaśikha; Pañcaśikha gave it to Ho-kia,[2] Ho-kia to Ulūka,[3] Ulūka to Po-p'o-li,[4] Po-p'o-li to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. By that transmission Īśvarakṛṣṇa obtained the knowledge. He saw that the great treatise (of Pañcaśikha) was difficult to keep in the memory and consequently he reduced it to seventy verses which we have just commented on, and which commence with 'By reason of the torment caused by the three sorts of misery, the inquiry into the means of destroying them is necessary' (v. I). That is why it is said:

'*Īśvarakṛṣṇa expounded it briefly, knowing the fundamentals of the truth.*'—An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse:

LXXII.
Ch. LXXI. } *This treatise in seventy verses exhausts that of the sixty-thousand verses; it explains (the sorts of) creation which proceed from (eight) causes,*[5] *up to the fifty categories (relating to the Intellect).*[6]

[1] . . . . 'field of knowledge' seems to correspond to 'kṣetra-jña' one of the names of Spirit; cf. *Buddhacarita*, XII. 20. For some term borrowed from the Purāṇas by Sanskrit terminology, cf. Garbe, *Sāṁkhyaphilosophie*, pages 205, 293; Max Müller, *Six Systems*, page 322.

[2] . . . Ho-kia; *Jap.*, Kat'-kia; very probably Gārgya.

[3] . . . Yeou-leouk'a; *Jap.*, U-lo-kia; *Sk.*, Ulūka.

[4] . . . . Po-p'o-li; *Jap.*, Bat'-ba-li. It is difficult to get back to the original. I am of opinion that it is a mistake for . . . Po-li-so; *Jap.*, Bat'-li-sha; *Sk.*, Vṛṣā (cf. Vārṣagaṇya). Cf. my Introduction.

[5] Cf. XLVI, note.

[6] One sees that in this verse and in the corresponding verse of Gauḍapāda the first hemistiches alone correspond. But see the end of the commentary.

Commentary.

The subjects of this treatise do not differ from those of that treatise ; [1] a preceding verse explains them thus (v. XLVI) : ' Creation derives in its nature from the Intellect ; it is of four sorts : doubt (5), incapacity (28), contentment (9), and perfection (8). Considering the disparity of the *guṇas*, there are fifty divisions in the Intellect. Besides these fifty divisions, there are ten other categories as is said in the verse : ' (1) The existence (of Nature), (2) the fact that she is unique, (3) the end of Spirit, (4 and 5) the five reasons (by which one establishes the existence of Spirit and of Nature, (6) the isolation of Spirit, (7) union,' (8) ' separation, (9) the multiplicity of spirits, (10) the duration of the body ; those are the ten categories. [2]

(1) ' Existence ' means the existence of the effect in the cause (v. IX). (2) ' Uniqueness ' : Nature is one and she evolves for the profit of numerous Spirits (v. XVI). (3) ' The end of Spirit ' (accomplished by Nature) : this means that Nature makes Spirit capable of associating itself with objects and seeing later the distinction (between Spirit and Nature) (cf. v. XLII).

(4 and 5). ' The five reasons ' : by five reasons one establishes the reality of Nature (v. XV), and even so the reality of Spirit (v. XVII). (6) ' Isolation ' : by perfect knowledge Spirit attains definitive and final isolation (vv. LXVII, LXVIII). (7) ' Union ' (of Spirit and Nature) takes place because both are omnipresent (v. LXVI). (8) ' Separation ' takes place, as we have seen it (v. LXVIII). (9) ' Multiplicity of Spirits ' : because life and death are not the same (for every individual), as we have explained it (vv. XVII, XVIII). (10) ' Duration of the body ' : it is made by the subtle body so long as knowledge is not acquired (v. XLI).

[1] This phrase is the translation of the first hemistich of the last verse of Gauḍapāda. It says that what the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* contains is also contained in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*. To illustrate this point still better, the commentary enumerates the fifty subjects of the two treatises. This commentary gives us the almost complete certainty that the great lost work of Pañcaśikha on the Sāṁkhya system contained fully 60,000 verses, and that it is identical with the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, of which we know the existence from yet other sources (Gauḍapāda, v. XVII ; the same, Paramārtha ; Vyāsa, *Yogabhāṣya*, *Sūtra*, IV, 13 ; cf. Garbe, *Mondschein*, p. 627, note 3).

[2] This verse is given in the *Rājavārttika* according to Vācaspati Miśra (S.T.K., v. LXXII) ; it is further cited in the *Sāṁkhyakramadīpikā* (n. 68) of Kṣemānanda. Here it is :

pradhānāstitvam (1) ekatvam (2) arthavattvam (3) athānyatā (?) |
pārārthyañ ca (?) tathānaikyam (9) viyogo (8) yoga (7) eva ca |
śeṣavṛttir (10) akartṛtvam (?) maulikārthāḥ smṛtāḥ daśa |

. . . . . *Anyatā*, *pārārthya* and *akartṛtva* do not seem to be found in the Chinese text. Perhaps, has Paramārtha read *pañcārthya* in the place of *pārārthya* ? Thus would be explained his ' five reasons ' (4 and 5).

These ten, with the fifty categories, form the subjects of the sixty-thousand verses (of Pañcaśikha); the treatise in seventy verses is thus identical (as for subjects) with the treatise of sixty-thousand.

One may ask: 'What is the difference between the great treatise and the little one in seventy verses?' Reply: 'The traditions of the ancient Sages and the refutations of the opinions of others are found in the great [treatise], but not in this one. That is the difference.' '

[1] This is the translation of the last hemistich of Gauḍapāda, v. LXXII: 'Ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ paravādavivarjitās cā 'pi.' The commentary reproduces then what the text has omitted. It was, perhaps, impossible for the Chinese translator to enclose within the twenty characters of his verse the entire sense of the Sanskrit verse. Paramārtha seems to have been often obliged to skip in the translation of the text this or that word, free to take it up again in the commentary.